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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian antidumping law provides for measures which are
intended to protect domestic producers against "material injury"
caused by foreign manufacturers that dump imported like goods on
the Canadian market.' Domestic buyers inevitably have to bear the
cost of these protective measures, but the cost to buyers can easily be
greater than the benefit to the protected domestic producers. Two
recent and important decisions by Canada's Anti-dumping Tribu-
nal2 (Tribunal) illustrate this proposition. One of these decisions
concerned the importation of hydraulic turbines from the Soviet
Union,3 while the other involved the importation of Japanese hydro-
electric generators.4 In both cases, the Tribunal found that there was
a likelihood of material injury from future dumping, and as a conse-
quence, antidumping measures are now in effect for the importation
of turbines from the Soviet Union5 and generators from Japan.6
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the social cost that
would have accrued to Canada if antidumping measures against
Soviet turbines and Japanese generators had been in effect during
the time period which was the subject of the Tribunars investigation.
Evidence presented during the Tribunal's public proceedings wholly
supports the observation that antidumping policy is not a zero sum
game. Analysis of the potential social cost demonstrates that Cana-
dian buyers of imported turbines and generators would have lost
more than domestic producers would have gained if antidumping
protection had been available during the relevant years.7 In this arti-
1. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-15 (1970), amended by CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. 1, 10 (1970); CAN. STAT. ch. 43, 63 (1970, 1971, 1972). See infra note II and
accompanying text.
2. The Tribunal was established by and derives its authority from the Anti-dump-
ing Act. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-15, §§ 21-30 (1970). See infra notes
21-25 and accompanying text. It is composed of not more than five members, Id at
§ 21(1).
3. Hydraulic Turbines for Electric Power Generation, Not Including Bulb Type
Turbines, Originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Anti-dumping Tribunal
Inquiry No. ADT-4-76 (July 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Turbines Case].
4. Alternating Current Electric Generators For Use With Hydraulic Turbines Or
Water-Wheels, Including Components Whether Or not Imported Separately, For Use In
The Assembly, Construction Or Installation Of Such Generators, As Well As Thrust
Bearings And Generator Shafts For Use In Association With Or Connected To Such
Generators, But Excluding In All Cases Excitation Systems, Originating In Or Exported
From Japan, Anti-dumping Tribunal Inquiry No. ADT-1 1-79 (February 29, 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Generators Case].
5. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 15.
6. See Generators Case, supra note 4, at 14.
7. See infra §§ III and IV.
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cle, the excess of the domestic buyers' loss over the producers' gain is
referred to as the "net national burden."
The potential national burden of antidumping measures can be
determined using either of two alternative assumptions. One
approach assumes that, in the absence of dumping, domestic buyers
would have continued to import turbines and generators from either
the same sources or from other countries.8 This assumption for the
most part is in accord with the Tribunal's findings concerning the
past contracts it investigated in the turbines and generators cases.9 If
antidumping measures had been in effect prior to the Tribunal's
finding that material injury likely would result from future dumping,
they would have caused a substantial excess burden, because buyers
would have paid much higher prices for their imports. The actual
beneficiaries of Canadian antidumping measures in this hypothetical
situation would have been foreign suppliers. Domestic producers
competing with the importers would have gained little or nothing.
The alternative assumption is that in the absence of dumping,
domestic producers would have won all or most of the disputed con-
tracts. 10 This assumption accords with the claims made by domestic
producers in the turbines and generators cases. Even if the claims
proved to be accurate, however, the net result would have been a
national burden in the sense that domestic producers would have
gained less from antidumping protection than domestic buyers
would have lost.
The analysis in this study is based on evidence pertaining to a
period when antidumping protection for turbines and generators had
not yet taken effect. This evidence is at least roughly indicative,
however, of the potential magnitude of the burden that may result
while the Tribunal's decisions are in effect, and it is thus well-suited
to illustrating the nature of the burden of antidumping measures.
Although the specific conclusions in this article are based on an anal-
ysis of the two individual cases, the general considerations concern-
ing antidumping policy lend themselves to broader application.
8. See infra § III.
9. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 14; Generators Case supra note 4, at 12.
10. See infra § IV.
1982]
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II. THE ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL'S FINDINGS
CONCERNING TURBINES AND GENERATORS
A. THE ANTI-DUMPING ACT AND THE ANTI-DUMPING
TRIBUNAL
Canada's Anti-dumping Act" provides a mechanism for
domestic producers to obtain government protection when the
dumping of imported goods causes or threatens to cause material
injury to the production of like goods in Canada. The Act conforms
to the Anti-dumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),12 in that it requires a determination of dumping, and
a determination of material injury to domestic production,13 prior to
the imposition of antidumping duties on a foreign product. The
Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise investi-
gates whether a product has been dumped on the Canadian mar-
ket.14 The investigation usually is conducted in response to a
complaint by a domestic producer.' 5 Dumping of imports occurs
when the export price' 6 of the goods in question is less than their
11. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-15 (1970), amended by CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. 1, 10 (1970), CAN. STAT. ch. 43, 63 (1970, 1971, 1972). The Department of
Finance introduced proposals for further amendments in July of 1980. Dep't of Finance,
Proposals on Import Policy (1980) (discussion paper); the Sub-Committee on Import Pol-
icy of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade, and Economic Affairs of the House of
Commons has discussed these proposals. See SUBCOMM. ON IMPORT POL'Y OF THE
STANDING COMM. ON FIN., TRADE AND ECON. AFF., REP. ON THE SPECIAL IMPORT
MEASURES ACT (1982). See also Stegemann, Special Import Measures Legislation:
Deterring Dumping of Capital Goods, 8 CAN. PuB. PoL'v 573 (1982).
12. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Jun. 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 438, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, reprinted in White Paper on
Anti-dumping, 11-24 (1968). The agreement took place at the end of the Kennedy Round
negotiations. The Anti-dumping Code was revised during the Tokyo Round Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650, reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Code],
13. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. A-15 §§ 3-5 (1970).
14. Id at § 13. The relevant portion of the Act provides:
The Deputy Minister shall forthwith cause an investigation to be initiated
respecting the dumping of any goods, on his own initiative or on receipt of a
complaint in writing by or on behalf of producers in Canada of like goods, if
(a) he is of the opinion that there is evidence that the goods have been or
are being dumped; and
(b) either
(i) he is of the opinion that there is evidence, or
(ii) the Tribunal advises that it is of the opinion that there is
evidence,
that the dumping referred to in paragraph (a) has caused, is causing or is
likely to cause material injury to the production in Canada of like goods or
has materially retarded or is materially retarding the establishment of the
production in Canada of like goods.
Id at § 13(1).
15. Id See infra Appendix A for a presentation of antidumping procedures.
16. The Act defines export prices as:
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"normal value" as determined under the Act and the Anti-dumping
Regulations.' 7 In the simplest case, the normal value 8 is identical to
the price at which the exporter sells like goods 19 in its home market,
although the matter is not that simple in the majority of cases. If the
Deputy Minister finds that goods are being dumped, and that the
margin of dumping20 is not negligible, he issues a Preliminary Deter-
mination of Dumping,2' and refers the case to the Anti-dumping
Tribunal.22 The Tribunal then has ninety days to determine whether
dumped imports have caused or threaten to cause material injury to
domestic production. 23 If the Tribunal finds either material injury
or a likelihood of future injury, the Deputy Minister makes a Final
Determination of Dumping.24 He then imposes antidumping duties
to offset the margin of dumping for any imports of the subject goods
an amount equal to the lesser of
(a) the exporter's sale price for the goods, and
(b) the importer's purchase price for the goods, adjusted in the manner pre-
scribed by the regulations to exclude all charges thereon resulting from or arising
after their shipment from the place described in paragraph 9(l)(d) or, where
applicable, the place substituted therefor in determining normal value by virtue
of paragraph 9(2)(a).
Anti-dumping Act, CAN. Rnv. STAT. ch. A-15, § 10(1) (1970).
17. 106 CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS. 872 (1978). The Act states:
"For the purposes of this Act,
(a) goods are dumped if the normal value of the goods exceeds the export
price of the goods."
Anti-dumping Act, CAN. Rnv. STAT. ch. A-15, § 8(a) (1970).
18. The Act defines the normal value of any goods as:
the price of like goods when sold by the exporter
(a) to purchasers with whom, at the time of the sale of the like goods, the
exporter is not associated,
(b) in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption under competi-
tive conditions,
(c) during such period, in relation to the time of the sale of the goods to the
importer in Canada, as may be prescribed by the regulations, and
(d) at the place from which the goods were shipped directly to Canada or,
if the goods have not been shipped to Canada, at the place from which the
goods would be shipped directly to Canada under normal conditions of
trade,
as adjusted by allowances calculated in the manner prescribed by the regulations
to reflect the differences in the terms and conditions of sale, in taxation and other
differences relating to price comparability between the sale of the goods to the
importer in Canada and the sales by the exporter of the like goods but with no
other allowances affecting price comparability whatever.
id at § 9(l).
19. Like goods are "(a) goods that are identical in all respects to the said goods, or (b)
in the absence of any goods described in paragraph (a), goods the characteristics of which
closely resemble those of the said goods." Id at § 2(1).
20. The margin of dumping is "the amount by which the normal value of the goods
exceeds the export price of the goods." Id at § 8(b).
21. Id at § 14(1).
22. Id at § 14(2)(c).
23. Id at §§ 14(2)(d), 16, amended by CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1 (1970).
24. Id at § 17(1).
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from those countries covered by the Tribunal's finding of injury.25
The Anti-dumping Tribunal is a court of record.26 Its proceed-
ings include public hearings at which interested parties present evi-
dence and arguments. 27 During the twelve year period between
January 1969 and December 1980, the Tribunal considered a total of
103 antidumpingcases. 28 In thirty seven cases, the Tribunal found
"no material injury;" in the remainder, the Tribunal found that
dumping had caused or was likely to cause material injury to domes-
tic production.29 The Tribunal's cases concern a variety of products;
it has considered even such small consumer items as wooden clothes
pins30 and high school yearbooks.3' In addition, major Canadian
manufacturers of various chemical products, steel, machinery, and
electrical products have taken advantage of the protection of the
Anti-dumping Act.3 2
The two cases analyzed in this article are in many ways repre-
sentative of the Tribunal's capital goods cases under the existing
Canadian procedures. In both the Soviet turbines and the Japanese
generators cases, the Tribunal concluded that future dumping by the
named countries would be "likely to cause material injury to the
production in Canada of like goods. '3 3 A brief description of the
Tribunal's reasoning in these two cases will provide a factual setting
for this study's argument concerning the social cost of antidumping
measures.
B. THE SOVIET TURBINES CASE
The turbines case officially commenced in August 1975 when
the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise, gave
notice that he had initiated an investigation concerning the dumping
of hydraulic turbines originating in the Soviet Union.34 Almost nine
25. Id at § 17(2).
26. Id at § 27.
27. Id at §§ 27-29.
28. 1980 ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL ANN. REP. 42-51 [hereinafter cited as ADT ANN.
REP.]. For a summary of the Tribunal's activities for the years 1969-80, see infra Appen-
dix B.
29. See ADT ANN. REP., supra note 28, at 42-5 1. See infra Appendix B.
30. See ADT ANN. REP., supra note 28, at 46, 50.
31. Id at 51.
32. Id at 42-5 1. Indeed, the Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers Association of
Canada, [EEMAC] in a recent brief, proudly stated that the "electrical and electronics
industry has had more experience than any other with the present antidumping regime.
Members of our industry have been or are currently involved in a total of 12 anti-dump-
ing cases, involving dumping from I I countries." ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC MANU-
FACTURERS A. OF CAN. [EEMAC] SUBMISSION TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SUBCOMM.
ON IMPORT PoL'y 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as EEMAC SUBMISSION].
33. See Turbines Case, supra note 3; Generators Case, supra note 4.
34. 109 CAN. GAZ. 3597 (Part I, Aug. 16, 1975).
CANADIAN ANTID UMPING POLICY
months later, the Deputy Minister indicated that he was "satisfied
that the mentioned goods have been or are being dumped and that
the margin of dumping of the dumped goods and the actual or
potential volume thereof is not negligible." 35 He therefore issued a
Preliminary Determination of Dumping and referred the case to the
Anti-dumping Tribunal.3 6
During three days of public and in camera hearings, the Tribu-
nal heard presentations on behalf of Canadian producers of hydrau-
lic turbines, the Soviet exporter and its Canadian importing
subsidiary, EMEC Trading Limited (EMEC), and two provincial
utility companies who were end users of the disputed imports.37
Dominion Engineering Works Limited (DEW) of Montreal was the
complainant in the turbines case.38 DEW, a fully-owned subsidiary
of Canadian General Electric Company Limited (CGE), is by far the
larger of two turbine manufacturers in Canada. The other domestic
producer, Marine Industries Limited (MIL),39 of Sorel, Quebec,
played only a limited part in the inquiry.40
The Tribunal's inquiry, like the Deputy Minister's previous
investigation, focused on three contracts that the Soviet exporter had
won in Canada during the 1971-75 period.41 Two of these were
awarded by the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (B.C.
Hydro) for its Mica Creek and Peace River "Site One" projects.42
The third set of turbines had been purchased by the New Brunswick
Electric Power Commission for the Mactaquac project on the St.
John River.43 The complainant DEW claimed that the entry of the
Soviets into the Canadian turbine market occurred at "price levels
which have had a serious impact on employment, profitability and
market share, and that the survival of the domestic industry is
threatened if dumping of the subject goods is allowed to continue."44
Counsel for the Soviet exporter/importer countered that there was
no evidence that dumping caused material injury to Canadian pro-
35. 110 CAN. GAz. 2194 (Part I, May 8, 1976).
36. Id.; Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 2.
37. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 3.
38. Id
39. MIL is controlled by Soci~t6 g6n6rale d'investissement, a provincial ctown corpo-
ration. Id at 5.
40. Id at 3.
41. Id at 9-10.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id at 7. The Anti-dumping Act does not define "material injury." The Tribu-
nal's Rules of Procedure, however, list the types of information that the Tribunal consid-
ers. ANTI-DUMPrNG TRIBUNAL, RULES OF PROCEDURE § 11 (1974). See also P.
SLAYTON, THE ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL 22-26 (1979).
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ducers of hydraulic turbines.45 Representatives of the Soviet trading
agency contended that:
the two contracts they obtained in the B.C. market were taken from the Japa-
nese and not from the two Canadian producers, while the contract for Macta-
quac was obtained because of the superiority of the USSR-designed Kaplan
turbine. In addition, they claimed that DEW and MIL were enjoying full
bookings and that their production capacity had not been affected, nor had
DEW's profits been affected.46
The Tribunal concurred with the importer's argument that in
the absence of the particularly attractive Soviet bids, a Japanese
importer, rather than DEW, would have won the two B.C. Hydro
contracts. 47 Although in regard to the Mactaquac project, the Tribu-
nal concluded that DEW would have won the contract in the
absence of dumping by the Soviet Union, it determined that it was
"not persuaded that the loss of this one order could have, of itself,
resulted in material injury to domestic production. '48 The Tribunal
thus found that past dumping of turbines from the Soviet Union had
not caused material injury to Canadian producers. 49 However, the
Tribunal reached a different conclusion with regard to the question
of whether material injury might arise from future dumping. The
Tribunal assumed "that unless inhibited by the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, the USSR will continue to dump hydraulic tur-
bines," 50 and decided "that there is a likelihood of material injury
being caused to Canadian producers by reason of such dumping. '51
The Tribunal arrived at its conclusion on the future effects of
Soviet dumping of turbines by investigating the anticipated turbine
demand of Canadian public utilities for the years 1976 through
1979.52 Approximately 28% of the anticipated requirements were in
the province of Quebec, "where one might reasonably assume the
two Canadian producers will continue to be treated preferentially. '53
The Tribunal did not factor B.C. Hydro into its consideration of
anticipated turbine demand, because "it may be that in British
Columbia. . .if the USSR do [sic] not get the business, the Japa-
nese will."' 54 The Tribunal concluded, however, that Canadian pro-
45. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 8.
46. Id
47. Id at 9-10.
48. Id at 10.
49. Id
50. Id at 13.
51. Id
52. Id at 13-14.
53. Id at 14. The two producers could expect favorable treatment in Quebec
because Hydro Quebec, the provincial utility, maintains a policy of buying its equipment
from producers who do a substantial amount of manufacturing in Quebec. Generators
Case, supra note 4, at 7. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
54. Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 14.
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ducers ought to be protected against Soviet dumping in the rest of
the country.
The attitude of B.C. Hydro is no justification for permitting the USSR to
continue to dump. There are other substantial awards in the offing in other
provinces in Canada, apart from Quebec.... In those markets, continued
USSR dumping would be a severe inhibiting factor to bidding by the Cana-
dian producers.55
The hydraulic turbines case thus resulted in the imposition of
antidumping duties equal to the margin of dumping on future
imports from the Soviet Union. The ruling did not interfere with
existing contracts, as the Tribunal ruled that the likelihood of mate-
rial injury applied only for imports of Soviet turbines "under any
contracts entered into after the date of this finding."' 56 Application
of antidumping duties to existing contracts would have been very
costly for the importer, the Soviet trading agency EMEC, because
the turbines for the Site One and Mactaquac projects were scheduled
to be shipped after the Tribunals decision. In addition, the margin
of dumping had been set at 69.82% of the f.o.b. export price, or 41%
of the normal value.57
The normal value of the Soviet turbines was determined by
"ministerial prescription." 58 Apparently, in April 1976, the Deputy
Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Exise ruled that the
Japanese producer Hitachi's bid for the Mica project in British
Columbia represented the "normal value" of the Soviet turbines,
and that the same margin of dumping applied to each of the three
Soviet bids under investigation by the Tribunal. When the Tribunal
found that future injury from Soviet dumping was likely, imports of
Soviet turbines under new contracts automatically became subject to
antidumping duties equal to 69.82% of the turbines' export price, for
55. Id
56. Id at 15.
57. Letter from James Day, Director, Policy and Systems, Special Assessment Pro-
grams, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, to Klaus Stegemann (Oct. 10, 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Day letter]. While the importer did not have to pay antidumping duties
on imports under existing contracts, normal import duties of 15% were assessed on an
"advanced value," rather than on the actual export price, in accordance with § 39(a) of
the Customs Act. Customs Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 39(a) (1970). As the export
price was "advanced," or raised,, by 69.82%, the rate of duty in effect was 25.5% of the
actual export price, rather than 15%.
58. Section 9(7) of the Act, in effect, applies to countries with state-controlled econo-
mies. It provides:
the normal value of any goods that are shipped directly to Canada from a coun-
try where, in the opinion of the Minister,
(a) the government of that country has a monopoly or substantial monop-
oly of its export trade, or
(b) domestic prices are substantially determined by the government of that
country,
shall be determined in such manner as the Minister prescribes.
Antidumping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-15, § 9(7) (1970).
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as long as the April 1976 ministerial prescription on normal value
and the corresponding margin of dumping remained in effect. The
importer could not reduce or avoid the antidumping duty by charg-
ing higher prices, which would bring the export price of the turbines
above the established normal value. It is therefore not surprising,
under the circumstances, that the Soviet Union has not participated
in tenders for hydraulic turbines in the Canadian market since 1976.
The Tribunal's finding of future injury in the Soviet turbines
case remains unchanged more than six years after the original inves-
tigation. The Tribunal has not formally reviewed its decision, nor
does it plan to review it in the near future.5 9 The determination
stands despite the fact that neither ministerial prescriptions nor
findings of the Anti-dumping Tribunal are intended to be
permanent.60
C. THE JAPANESE GENERATORS CASE
The hydro-electric generators case originated in March 1979,
when the Deputy Minister gave notice that he had begun an investi-
gation into the dumping of alternating current electric generators
and components for use with hydraulic turbines or water-wheels
exported from Japan to Canada.61 The investigation led to a Prelim-
inary Determination of Dumping in December 1979.62 In February
1980, the Anti-dumping Tribunal ruled that although the dumping
of Japanese generators had not caused material injury to domestic
production at the time of the investigation, future dumping under
contracts formed after the date of the Tribunal's finding was likely to
cause material injury.6 3 The Tribunal's determination served as a
warning to Japanese suppliers of hydro-electric generators that
future imports would be scrutinized closely by National Revenue,
59. Letter from R. Roy, Assistant Secretary, Anti-dumping Tribunal, to Klaus Stege-
mann (Jun. 9, 1981) (confirmed in a telephone interview, Sept. 16, 1982). The Tribunal
reviews most decisions at certain intervals, and has rescinded many findings of material
injury. Details can be found in the Tribunal's Annual Reports. See, e.g., ADT ANN.
REP., supra note 28, at 42-51. See also infra Appendix B.
60. See Kaylor, What Can You Do About an Injury Finding by the Anti-dumping Tri-
bunal?, 67 IMPORTWEEK 2 (May 23, 1979). Indeed, the Deputy Minister's prescription in
the Soviet turbines case was modified in March 1981, to allow for determination of the
normal value by either of two methods. Interview with Mr. Alexander V. Dgebuadze,
President, EMEC Trading Limited, in Vancouver (Jul. 9, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Dgebuadze Interview]. One is the "third country" principle. See infra note 125 and
accompanying text. The other, used where sufficient information is unavailable, is the
assumption of a reduced margin of dumping equal to 35% of the export price. See infra
notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
61. 113 CAN. GAZ. 1632 (Part I, Mar. 17, 1979).
62. 113 CAN. GAz. 7643 (Part I, Dec. 15, 1979).
63. See Generators Case, supra note 4.
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and that antidumping duties would be imposed whenever export
prices were found to fall short of normal values.
The Deputy Minister found a substantial margin of dumping on
four out of the five contracts won by Japanese producers during the
years covered by the investigation." The margin of dumping during
those years, 1975-78, amounted on the average to 52% of export
prices, or 34.2% of normal values. 65 B.C. Hydro awarded four of the
five contracts, and Newfoundland Hydro awarded the fifth and
smallest contract.6 6 CGE, the larger of two Canadian manufacturers
of hydroelectric generators with production facilities in Ontario and
Quebec, was the complainant. 67 MIL, the second domestic pro-
ducer, was located entirely in Quebec, and enjoyed an assured mar-
ket in that province.68 It thus played only a minor role in the
generators case, as it had in the turbines case. CGE, or its turbine
producing subsidiary DEW, and B.C. Hydro were thus protagonists
in both the turbines and generators cases. CGE acted as the domi-
nant domestic producer of turbines and generators, while B.C.
Hydro was the principal end user of power generating equipment
that consistently has considered foreign bids for turbines and genera-
tors, offering no preferential treatment for domestic suppliers.69 The
Japanese manufacturers of hydroelectric generators and their Cana-
dian importing agents also were represented at the hearings before
the Tribunal.70 The focus of the argument, however, rested firmly
on B.C. Hydro's actions and its motives for buying Japanese rather
than CGE generators.71
The complainant alleged that the loss of large orders to aggres-
sively priced Japanese imports had led to "loss of production,
underutilization of engineering, design, and plant capacity, and
reduced profitability." 72 According to CGE's submission, injurious
dumping was likely to continue in the future because of Japan's
great uncommitted capacity for the production of hydroelectric gen-
erators.73 As a result, CGE would be forced to reduce or eliminate
investment in research and design, as well as in the expansion of
64. Id at 9.
65. See Day letter, supra note 57.
66. See Generators Case, supra note 4, at 9.
67. Id at 3.
68. Id at 5.
69. Indeed, CGE and B.C. Hydro were also the protagonists in two earlier cases
concerning the dumping of heavy electrical equipment, the 1970 power transformers
case, and the 1972 circuit breakers case.
70. See Generators Case, supra note 4, at 3.
71. Id at 5-6.
72. Id at 5.
73. Id
19821
304 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURAL [Vol. 15:293
production capacity.74 With respect to past dumping, the Tribunal
concluded "that the dumping of Japanese hydro generators in the
four cases cited by CGE has not in fact been the cause of material
injury, and that if the latter occurred, it must be attributed to other
causes. '75 The Tribunal based its conclusion largely on evidence
presented by B.C. Hydro concerning a longstanding dispute with
CGE. The dispute involved a 1967 contract calling for CGE to
install the first five hydrogenerators at B.C. Hydro's Portage Moun-
tain site on the Peace River. The Tribunal found that:
By 1975, what had earlier appeared to be a relatively minor problem in the
performance of the Portage Mountain generators had emerged as something
much more serious, of which the full dimensions had not yet been deter-
mined. CGE's response to this emerging problem, as B.C. Hydro then saw
the matter, had been unsatisfactory from both the technological and the legal
and commercial points of view. Furthermore, B.C. Hydro had become con-
cerned about two other contracts, Mica and Kootenay, which had been
awarded to CGE in 1972 before the seriousness of the Portage Mountain
problem was evident. The tensions and conflicts resulting from the Portage
Mountain problem caused a serious deterioration in the relationship between
B.C. Hydro and CGE, beginning with the specifics of generator production,
operation and repair but increasingly extending to the broader aspects of
relations between the two organizations. By 1975, it was asserted in evi-
dence, B.C. Hydro would not have been prepared to enter into any new con-
tract with CGE for the supply of hydro generators.76
Although the Tribunal found no injury due to past dumping, it
reached a different conclusion with respect to the likelihood of mate-
rial injury to CGE from future dumping.
In view of the long lead times from tender award to manufacturing activity
and the present state of CGE's order book, it seems almost inevitable that in
a couple of years CGE will find itself with much of its generator capacity
unutilized. This unfortunate situation will become more serious unless CGE
is able to limit the period of reduced* activity by obtaining a substantial por-
tion of the considerable volume of business expected to be awarded over the
next few years in the "open!' sector of the Canadian market. It is the Tribu-
nal's expectation that CGE will in fact be able to obtain much of this busi-
ness provided it does not have to compete with dumped imports, but that if
Japanese dumping continues CGE will be able to capture little if any of this
important market.77
The Tribunal viewed consideration of available business in the
"open" sector as particularly important, given the structure of the
Canadian hydrogenerator market.78 The Tribunal defined the
"open" sector of the Canadian market as "those provinces which
have significant hydro-electric potential still to develop but lack
74. Id
75. Id at 9.
76. Id at 9-10.
77. Id at 12.
78. Id at 6-8.
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hydro generator production facilities." 79 In Ontario, only minor
sites remain undeveloped. Quebec, of course, still has a large unreal-
ized potential for hydro-electric development. The government of
Quebec, however, has insisted, and is likely to continue to insist, on
limiting contracts to firms with substantial production facilities in
Quebec.80 The Tribunal also excluded the lower Churchill River
area of Labrador from its definition of the open sector, because the
federal government, which participates with Newfoundland in
developing the area, is expected to require preferential treatment for
domestic producers.8' With regard to the other Canadian provinces,
the Tribunal said: "In contrast. . ., the governments of the remain-
ing provinces have no direct responsibility for the well-being of
Canada's hydro generator industry but they do have a natural and
legitimate interest in buying; other things being equal, from the
cheapest source."'8 2
The Tribunal estimated that between the years 1980 and 1985
CGE would face unmitigated Japanese price competition in 30% of
the Canadian market if only the Atlantic and Prairie provinces were
counted.8 3 The market percentage would rise to over 50% "[i]f B.C.
Hydro should again be willing to purchase CGE hydro genera-
tors."8 4 The Tribunal anticipated this second possibility:
At the hearing, B.C. Hydro asserted its unwillingness to buy hydro genera-
tors from CGE for the foreseeable future. This is perhaps not surprising
considering the present dissension between the two parties. Following a set-
tlement, the situation should change. As in the past, B.C. Hydro continues to
place substantial orders with CGE for other types of heavy electrical equip-
ment. In light of these various factors, the Tribunal anticipates that at some
future date B.C. Hydro may, once again, be willing to purchase CGE hydro
generators. In light of that prospect, CGE should not be required to face the
competition in the B.C. market of Japanese imports offered at dumped
prices.8 5
Thus, both the generators and turbines cases had the same end
result; CGE no longer had to worry about future dumping from the
source countries mentioned in the rulings. The domestic producer,
however, was not satisfied with this result. In its view, existing
antidumping procedures permit foreign producers to obtain "free
bites" by dumping in the Canadian market before antidumping
79. Id at 7.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id at 8.
83. Id at 13.
84. .d
85. Id
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measures have been activated.86 The Tribunal, in refusing to find
past dumping by the Japanese in the generators case, and by the
Soviets in the turbines case, did nothing to eliminate the "free bites"
problem.
The remainder of this article draws on the facts of the turbines
and generators cases to determine the net national burden of
antidumping measures in the Canadian hydroelectric equipment
market. The net national burden or benefit is analyzed under two
alternative assumptions, to account for two conflicting claims con-
cerning the effects of antidumping measures. The first assumption is
that the Tribunal's findings were correct. This assumption implies
that the domestic buyer would have continued to import in the
absence of dumping. The alternative assumption is that CGE was
correct in alleging that, in the absence of dumping, domestically pro-
duced turbines and generators would have been substituted for the
disputed imports.
III. THE NET NATIONAL BURDEN IN CASE OF
CONTINUING IMPORTATION
A. No DIRECT GAIN FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS
The intent behind imposing antidumping protection evidently is
to transfer income from potential buyers of dumped imports to the
beneficiaries of the protection, such as CGE, a domestic producer8 7
This rationale, however, presupposes that antidumping measures
cause domestic buyers to switch from foreign to domestic suppliers.
If importation continues after the invocation of antidumping protec-
tion, buyers likely will face higher import prices, while domestic pro-
ducers can expect no corresponding benefit. The loss to the domestic
buyer that is attributable to higher import prices thus constitutes the
net national burden of antidumping measures.
In the two hydroelectric equipment cases reviewed in the previ-
ous section, the Anti-dumping Tribunal concluded that the domi-
nant domestic producer, CGE, or its subsidiary DEW, would suffer
86. See Stegemann, supra note 11, at § II. See id at § III for an analysis of deter-
rence arguments. If the proposed amendments had been in force during the period under
investigation, they might have prevented the reported dumping of turbines and genera-
tors, without any visible enforcement activity. It thus seems particularly appropriate to
use the evidence concerning the disputed electrical equipment contracts to determine the
potential burden of antidumping policy.
87. Although it is conceivable that antidumping measures may serve objectives
beyond protecting the income positions of domestic producers at the expense of domestic
consumers, the existing procedures do not suggest any other intent. See Stegemann, The
Efficiency Rationale ofAniidumping Policy and Other Measures of Contingency Protection,
in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND ch. 2 (J. Quinn and P. Slayton
eds. 1982).
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material injury if the dumping of Soviet turbines and Japanese gen-
erators were allowed to continue. As a consequence, the Tribunal
held that antidumping duties could be applied to protect CGE
against future dumping of these items. Yet in both cases, the Tribu-
nal accepted forceful evidence supporting the importer's argument
that CGE would not have won any of the disputed B.C. Hydro con-
tracts, even in the absence of dumping. For instance, if an
antidumping ruling for Soviet turbines had been in effect during
1971-75, the years from which the evidence was compiled, B.C.
Hydro almost certainly would have awarded the turbine contracts
for the Mica Creek and Peace River "Site One" projects to Japanese
suppliers. Indeed, since 1965, B.C. Hydro had awarded all other
contracts, covering twenty-one turbines, to Japanese bidders.88 The
Tribunal also acknowledged that B.C. Hydro was unlikely to
purchase domestic turbines following a finding that Soviet dumping
would cause material injury to domestic producers in the future.8 9 It
concluded, however, that the "attitude of B.C. Hydro" did not justify
permitting the Soviet Union to continue dumping turbines.90 The
Tribunal reasoned that there were "other substantial awards in the
offing in other provinces" which CGE (DEW) might win if the
Soviet Union were prevented from dumping.91
The evidence in the Japanese generators case supports conclu-
sions similar to those drawn concerning the turbines case. CGE
would not have won any additional B.C. Hydro contracts had
antidumping measures against generator imports from Japan been in
effect during the years in question. Whether B.C. Hydro would con-
sider buying CGE generators in the future was a matter of the Tribu-
nal's conjecture. Income transfers from B.C. Hydro, the domestic
buyer, to CGE, the domestic producer, however, would take place
only to the extent that B.C. Hydro was willing to purchase from
88. B.C. Hydro, Complete List of Authority Turbine Tenders and Awards (Oct. 12,
1979) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter cited as List of Turbine Tenders]. The
total of 21 turbines includes two for the Mica project. The Soviet Union had to share
that contract with Hitachi, the second-lowest bidder, because the Authority lacked
experience with the new entrant's performance.
89. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 14.
90. Id
91. Id The author still has not seen evidence regarding such awards from other
provinces. In 1977, however, B.C. Hydro purchased an additional set of four turbines
from a Japanese producer for its Revelstoke project. The winning Japanese bid was still
almost $5 million, or 18%, lower than DEW's. The Soviet Union, not surprisingly, did
not participate in the bidding for Revelstoke. See List of Turbine Tenders, supra note
88. The list identifies only formal bidders, which in many cases are Japanese trading
companies or Canadian subsidiaries of such companies. In this study, the author has
followed the common practice of identifying bids and contracts by the more familiar
names of the producers of electrical equipment, even if those producers did not bid
directly, or technically were not awarded a contract.
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CGE rather than from foreign producers. If B.C. Hydro and other
provincial power authorities continue to import Japanese or other
generators, in spite of the antidumping ruling against Japan, CGE
will gain no additional orders. Hydro authorities, however, may pay
higher prices for imported equipment.
B. THE BURDEN OF HIGHER IMPORT PRICES
The potential magnitude of the burden of higher import prices
in the absence of dumping in the turbines case can be calculated
using the data available to the Tribunal when it made its finding that
past dumping of turbines did not cause material injury to domestic
producers.92 For each of the turbine contracts under investigation,
there was a winning (dumped) bid, a domestic producer's bid, and,
in most cases, at least one "potentially intervening" bid from a third
party.93 A potentially intervening bid is a bid that the domestic
buyer would have accepted, in preference to the domestic producer's
bid, if the dumped bid either had not been available or had not been
as low. In this discussion, information on potentially intervening
bids will be used to determine how much more the provincial utility
would have had to pay for imported equipment if dumping had been
prevented.94
For both the Mica Creek and the Peace Site One contracts,
which B.C. Hydro awarded to Soviet producers, the Japanese pro-
92. See Turbines Case, supra note 3.
93. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
94. Although this approach involves hypothesizing the potential price burden to the
utility using actual figures from past contracts, it is the best way to approximate what the
utility would have paid in the absence of dumping. The reasons for the superiority of
this method are as follows. Antidumping rulings concerning heavy electrical equipment
tend to remain in effect for many years, and domestic buyers may continue to accept
foreign bids from third parties or former dumpers. It is not possible, however, to deter-
mine the burden of higher import prices when antidumping protection has been acti-
vated, because it is no longer possible to observe the dumped prices that would prevail in
the absence of the antidumping measures.
When exporters know that an antidumping duty equal to the margin of dumping will
be collected by the importing country, dumping will disappear or at least be reduced. It
will disappear if the end user of the imported product is responsible for the duty, because
the cost to the end user will equal the normal value. The exporter would rather receive
the normal value for any remaining contracts than a lower price on which the importing
country collects antidumping duty equal to the margin of dumping. Under current
Canadian law, the end user does not have to pay the duty unless he also acts as the
importer. Thus, end users might still pay less than the normal value while an antidump-
ing ruling is in effect, because the importing agent of the foreign supplier is willing to
absorb the antidumping duty. It appears that only relatively minor amounts of
antidumping duty have been collected, and usually only on goods that had been "in the
pipeline," rather than on contracts concluded after the activation of antidumping protec-
tion. See SLAYTON, supra note 44, at 53.
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ducer Hitachi submitted potentially intervening bids.95 These bids
were 8% lower than the Canadian bids submitted by DEW.96 The
Hitachi price, however, was 51% higher than the Soviet bid in the
case of Mica Creek,97 and 70% higher than the Soviet bid for Site
One.98 Thus, B.C. Hydro would have incurred a substantial extra
cost if the submission of Soviet bids had been prevented by an
existing antidumping ruling or an acute threat of antidumping
action. In 1971, B.C. Hydro had no experience with the performance
of the Soviet producer. Thus, B.C. Hydro awarded only two of the
four turbine contracts for Mica Creek to the Soviet Union. The
remaining contracts went to Hitachi. The absolute extra cost for the
Mica turbines would have been approximately $2.4 million if the
Soviet bid had been withheld.99 On the Site One contract, B.C.
Hydro would have incurred an extra cost of almost $18 million if the
authority had been forced to take the Hitachi bid rather than the
Soviet bid due to an antidumping action.100
For the Mactaquac project, there were only two bidders, DEW
and the Soviet trading agency.10' Yet, DEW might not have won the
contract even in the absence of dumping by the Soviet Union.
95. Table I
Three Contracts for Hydraulic Turbines Won by USSR Trading Agency in
Competition with Canadian Producer, 1971-75*
Potentially Intervening Japanese Bids
Number Winning Equivalent
Name of Site of Bidders USSR Bid Canadian Bid Fuji Hitachi Mitsubishi Toshiba
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mica Creek 8
- $1000 9,472 15,549 17,899 14,272 16,100 15,796
- DEW = 100 61 100 115 92 104 102
- USSR = 100 100 164 189 151 170 167
Peace Site One 4
- $1000 25,384 47,000** no bid 43,229 50,079 no bid
-DEW= 100 54 100 92 107
- USSR = 100 100 185 170 197
Mactaquac 2
-$1000 6,451 8,290*** no bid no bid no bid no bid
- DEW = I00 78 100
Brief of Dominion Engineering Works Limited, Public Exhibit No. D-I. Turbines Case, at Appendix (hear-
ings 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEW Turbines Brief].
*Note that all prices for the three contracts won by the Soviet Trading Agency include governors and
installation.
**The equivalent Canadian bid of $47,000,000 for the Peace Site One project is an escalated DEW bid.
See 2 Transcript of Public Hearing, Turbines Case, at 52 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ADT Turbines
Transcript].
***The equivalent Canadian bid of $8,290,000 for the Mactaquac project is a DEW bid, which has been
escalated using the same ratio used in escalating the Peace Site One bid.
96. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (3) and (5).
97. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (2) and (5).
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id
101. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (2) and (3).
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Indeed, counsel for the Soviet exporter/importer in the turbines case
summarized the evidence in the following manner: "In New Bruns-
wick N.B. Power was quite clear that price was not their prime con-
cern in the particular Mactaquac circumstances. It was the unhappy
experience it had had with D.E.W. Kaplans compared with the
demonstrated design, technical quality, ability -and reliability of the
LMZ Kaplans."' 0 2
The Soviet bid for Mactaquac would have been $8.5 million,
rather than the actual $6.45 million, if the Soviet trading agency
could have correctly anticipated the normal value prescribed by the
Deputy Minister of National Revenue in accordance with Section
9(7) of the Anti-dumping Act.103 Assuming New Brunswick Power,
the buyer for the Mactaquac project, still would have preferred a
higher Soviet bid to the Canadian bid because of quality advantages,
the extra cost would have been $2 million.l' 4  This amount is 32%
more than the bid the authority was able to obtain from the Soviet
Union in the actual case.
102. 2 ADT Turbines Transcript, supra note 95, at 34. "Kaplan" describes the type of
turbine required for Mactaquac and "LMZ" stands for Leningrad Metal Works.
103.
Table 2
Potential Effects of Antidumping Action on USSR Bids
for Three Hydraulic Turbine Contracts, 1971-75
Equivalent Potentially
Actual* Prescribed Value Absolute Margin Additional Potential Canadian Intervening
NameofSite USSRBid of Equipment of Dumping Normal Duty USSR Bid* Bid* Hitachi Bid*
115% of [(1)+(3)
[41% of col.(2)] col.(3)] +(4)]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mica Creek
- $1000 9,472 7,275 2,983 448 12903 15,549 14,272
- coL(6)-100 61 83 100 92
Peace Site One
-$1000 25,384 17,228 7,063 1,060 33,507 47,000"* 43,229
- col.(6)= 100 54 71 100 92
Mactaquac
- $1000 6,451 4.398 1,803 271 8,525 8,290" no bid
- coL(6)-100 78 103 100
Information in columns (1). (6), and (7) was obtained from the DEW Turbines Brief.upa note 95. at appendix. The figures
in column (2) were obtained from EMEC. See Dgebuadze Interview, nupra note 60.
.The prices in columns (1), (5), (6), and (7) include installation charges.
"The $47,000,000 figure for Peace Site One, and the $8,290,000 figure for Mactaquac, are both escalated DEW bids.
Column (2) of Table 2 shows the prescribed value for the imported turbines, excluding
installation. The alleged margin of dumping was 41% of the prescribed value, so the
amount in column (3) that should have been added to the actual bid in column (1) to
avoid dumping can be determined. Furthermore, the value for normal import duty had
to be "advanced" by the amount shown in column (3), which means that 15% of that
amount would have been added to the actual bid. The fictitious bid that the Soviet
Union should have tendered to avoid antidumping action is in column (5).
For a discussion of ministerial prescriptions under § 9(7) of the Anti-dumping Act, see
supra note 58.
104. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (5) and (1).
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The available data reveal that Mactaquac is the only case where
the prevention of dumping under the Deputy Minister's prescription
would have resulted in a Soviet bid which exceeded the Canadian
price.'0 5 For the other two hydroturbine projects, the potential
Soviet bid would still have been lower than the Canadian bid,10 6 and
even lower than the potentially intervening Hitachi bid.'0 7
This evidence raises several issues concerning the effects of
antidumping measures. The first issue is whether B.C. Hydro still
would have preferred higher Soviet bids, which would have satisfied
the Deputy Minister's prescription of normal values, to the bids of
the domestic producer. If. B.C. Hydro would have been willing to
pay the higher Soviet prices, the burden of higher import prices due
to antidumping protection would be determined by computing the
difference between the potential Soviet bid and the actual Soviet
bid, 10 8 rather than between the potentially intervening Hitachi bid
and the actual Soviet bid.109
The second issue concerns whether the Soviet bids were lower
than necessary to secure the B.C. Hydro contracts. The Soviet trad-
ing agency may have miscalculated its own bid by assuming that
other tenderers' bids would be lower than those actually submit-
ted. 110 The more plausible explanation is that the new entrant delib-
erately undercut all other bidders by a substantial margin in order to
secure a foothold in the Canadian market. Either scenario suggests
the argument that even without antidumping action the price advan-
tage of Soviet turbines would not be as large for future contracts as it
was during the years 1971-75. This argument implies that the bur-
den of higher import prices due to antidumping measures would be
less severe in the future than past bidding indicates.
The third issue suggested by the data on the turbines project'
concerns the concept of causation that the Anti-dumping Tribunal
apparently applies in its deliberations. If the Soviet trading agency
could have submitted the lowest bids for the B.C. Hydro contracts
without engaging in dumping, then dumping turbines on the Cana-
dian market could not materially injure domestic production,
because in either case, the Soviets would have won the contracts.
105. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (5) and (6).
106. Id
107. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (5) and (7).
108. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (1) and (5).
109. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (1) and (7). Although the additional nor-
mal import duty in column (4) would have been a burden to B.C. Hydro, it would not
have been part of the national burden.
110. For a general discussion of this problem, see Morse, Probabilistic Bidding Models
A Synthesis, 18 BusmEss HORIZONs 67-74 (1975).
111. See supra note 103, Table 2.
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Similarly, if future Soviet bids were to remain the lowest in the
absence of dumping, and of antidumping measures, future dumping
by the Soviet Union would not cause material injury to domestic
producers. These considerations apparently were not discussed dur-
ing the Tribunal's proceedings.
The Tribunal actually determined that the acceptance of Soviet
bids for the two B.C. Hydro contracts did not cause any injury to
domestic producers because Hitachi submitted potentially interven-
ing bids in both cases.1 12 The Tribunal's approach in the actual tur-
bines case presumes that the Soviet Union would not have won the
two contracts in the absence of dumping. Even in the absence of
dumping, however, the price advantage of the Soviet turbines over
the Hitachi product for the Mica project would have been 9%.113 It
might be argued that in 1971 the Soviets needed a price advantage of
more than 9% to overcome the disadvantage of being an untried sup-
plier of turbines in the Canadian market. It is unlikely, however,
that a price advantage of 21%,114 which was the difference between
the potential Soviet bid and the potentially intervening Hitachi bid
for the Site One project, would have been insufficient to secure the
Site One contract for the Soviet Union in 1975. It is equally implau-
sible that similar Soviet price advantages, maintained in the absence
of dumping, would have been insufficient if the Soviet Union had
wished to win future contracts in the "open" sector of the Canadian
market for hydraulic turbines.
If the data presented concerning potential Soviet bids,
equivalent Canadian bids, and potentially intervening Hitachi
bids" 5 correctly reflect the magnitude of the price advantages that
the Soviet Union could have retained if it had been required to con-
form to the Deputy Minister's prescription on normal value, why did
the Soviet trading agency choose not to participate in post-1975 ten-
ders for hydraulic turbines?' 1 6 The answer involves the peculiar
effect of a ministerial prescription, which requires that new contracts
automatically become subject to antidumping duties, regardless of
the prices quoted. In other words, the Soviet trading agency did not
have the option of avoiding antidumping duties for new contracts by
quoting prices that would conform to the prescribed normal values.
After the Tribunal decided in July, 1976 that material injury to
domestic production was likely to result from the dumping of Soviet
112. See Turbines Case, supra note 3, at 9.
113. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (5) and (7).
114. Id
115. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (5), (6), and (7).
116. E.g., B.C. Hydro's Revelstoke project in 1977.
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turbines under new contracts, 1 7 the Customs and Excise Division of
the Department of National Revenue regarded any imports of Soviet
turbines under new contracts as dumped. 118 Moreover, the Customs
and Excise Division set the margin of dumping equal to the margin
established by ministerial prescription for the three past contracts.19
A calculation of the difference between the prescribed value of
the equipment and the absolute margin of dumping indicates that
the Soviet trading agency quoted an export price of $4,292,000 for
the Mica project turbines. 120 If the same bid had been submitted
after the antidumping decision took effect, the importing agent
would have had to pay the amounts represented by the absolute
margin of dumping and the additional normal import duty on the
margin of dumping. 21 The net export price, that is, the bid price
minus the duties, thus would have been reduced by 79.9%, to
$861,000.122 If the Soviet trading agency had intended to realize the
same net export price after the imposition of antidumping measures
as it would have received before the decision, it would have had to
increase its export price for the equipment to $71,533,333.123 In view
of these figures, Customs and Excise seems to have understated the
case in saying that "the nature of the prescription makes it very diffi-
cult for the Soviets to compete in the Canadian market because any
future contract that they may enter into with a Canadian utility
would result in automatic dumping."'124
In order to alleviate the situation Customs and Excise attempted
to develop suitable alternative methods to estimate the value of
117. See Turbines Case, supra note 3.
118. Letter of K.H. McCammon, Director General, Anti-dumping Directorate, Reve-
nue Canada, Customs and Excise, to R. Johnson, Manager, Purchasing & Supply, British
Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (Dec. 30, 1977) (cited with permission of B.C.
Hydro).
119. See id
120. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (2) and (3).
121. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (3) and (4).
122. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (1), (3), and (4). The total percentage of
79.9% is composed of a 69.5% antidumping duty on the export price, which corresponds
to 41% of the prescribed value, plus 10.4%, or .15 (69.5%), of the export price for addi-
tional import duty. This second factor derives from the fact that the base value for duty
would have been calculated by "advancing" the export price by an amount equivalent to
the margin of dumping. The MFN (Most Favored Nation) rate of duty for hydraulic
turbines at the time was 15%. For the sake of accuracy it should also be noted that the
rate of antidumping duty calculated by Customs and Excise was 69.82%, rather than
69.5%.
123. The required export price (X) can be calculated with the following equation:
4,292,000 = X - .799X - .15(X-4,292,000) or X = .85(4,292,000) 71,533,333. In the
equation, the term .799X is the deduction due to antidumping action. See supra note
122. The term .15 (X-4,292,000) is the additional normal duty on the required price
increase.
124. Letter of K.H. McCammon, supra note 118.
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Soviet turbines. In March, 1981, five years after the initial prescrip-
tion, the Deputy Minister finally issued a revised procedure.
According to this procedure the normal value of hydraulic turbines
originating in the USSR:
shall be determined on the basis of:
(a) the total contract price of a comparable hydraulic turbine, delivered and
installed on site, manufactured in a country selected by the Minister,
less all costs and charges attributable to the shipment of the hydraulic
turbine from the factory to the site and its installation at the site, or
(b) where sufficient information has not been furnished or is not available
to determine the normal value under paragraph (a), the export price of
the hydraulic turbine, as determined under section 10 of the Anti-
dumping Act, plus an advance of 35 per cent .... 125
While the provisions of paragraph (a) of the new procedure
allow the Soviet Union to supply turbines under new contracts with-
out automatically becoming subject to antidumping duties, there
remains considerable uncertainty about its practical implementation.
The Minister presumably will select a third country bid as a stan-
dard for comparison, that is, as a normal value, only after a bid has
been submitted by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet supplier will
not know the normal value deemed by the Deputy Minister in
advance. Furthermore, this "third country" approach makes it more
difficult for a newcomer to enter the market, as the prescription may
remove the new entrant's price advantage over competing foreign
producers who are better established in the relevant market. Finally,
the threat of automatic application of antidumping duties remains
under the new procedure. 2 6 Although the procedure under section
(b) reduces the prescribed margin of dumping from 69.82% of the
export price to 35%,127 the effect on the Soviet supplier may still be
prohibitive, as the data for the Mica project demonstrate.128 If the
Soviet Union had submitted the same actual bid for the Mica tur-
bines, the application of a 35% margin would have reduced the net
export receipt by 40.2% from $4,292,000 to $2,265,000.129 If, on the
other hand, the Soviet agency had intended to receive the same net
export price as it expected prior to antidumping action, the global
bid would have been increased from $9,472,000 to $13,332,000.130
125. Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, Ministerial Prescription, March 25, 1981
[hereinafter Ministerial Prescription].
126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
127. See Ministerial Prescription, supra note 125.
128. See supra note 103, Table 2.
129. See supra note 103, Table 2, columns (2) and (3). See also supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
130. For the computation of the increase in the bid as a result of antidumping meas-
ures, see supra notes 122 and 123. The potential global bid is derived by adding the
difference between $9,472,000 and $4,292,000 to the computed export price. A global bid
is one for both the supply and installation of equipment.
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All other things remaining constant, the Soviet bid still would have
been the lowest in the Mica tender,131 but the closest Japanese bid
would have exceeded the Soviet bid by only 7%, compared to a 51%
advantage in the absence of antidumping action.1 32
If the new prescription had been in effect at the time, the Soviet
trading agency might have been willing to absorb some additional
duty to overcome the goodwill that the Japanese firms undoubtedly
possessed as the established suppliers of turbines to B.C. Hydro. As
a consequence, the net export price would have been reduced below
the price level actually attained prior to the application of antidump-
ing measures. In this situation, the cost to the domestic user of
imported equipment would increase.133 The cost to the country as a
whole, however, would fall, because the import price net of duties
would fall.134 The duty collected would more than offset the price
increase to the user. The difference between the price increase to the
user and the gain in duties to the nation might then be called the
"national gain" attributable to antidumping policy.
The prescription which was in effect from April 1976 to March
1981135 most likely caused a net national burden, as it excluded the
most competitive foreign bidder, the Soviet Union. The earlier pre-
scription therefore favored more costly sources of imported hydrau-
lic turbines. B.C. Hydro, which is the most significant purchaser of
hydroelectrical equipment to consistently entertain international
bidding, has awarded two major turbine contracts since Mica and
Site One.136 It awarded both contracts to Japanese producers. 37
The first, a contract for three turbines for the Seven Mile project,
may not be entirely relevant here, as it was awarded in May of
1975;138 the antidumping investigation concerning turbines from the
Soviet Union officially did not begin until August of that year.' 39
The second contract involved four turbines for Revelstoke, and was
awarded in September 1977.140 Thus, the bidding took place during
the period of the prohibitive ministerial prescription. Fuji, which
bid at a firm price of $26.5 million, won the Revelstoke contract. 41
131. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (3)-(7).
132. See supra note 95, Table 1, column (5); see also supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
133. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
134. Id
135. See Ministerial Prescription, supra note 125.
136. See B.C. Hydro, List of Turbine Tenders, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
137. See B.C. Hydro, List of Turbine Tenders, supra note 88.
138. Id
139. See 109 CAN. GAz. 3597 (Part I, Aug. 16, 1975).
140. See List of Turbine Tenders, supra note 88.
141. Id
1982]
316 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:293
The remaining four bids were higher and subject to escalation; they
were submitted by two other Japanese producers, as well as MIL and
DEW. 142 The price the Soviet trading agency would have submitted
for Revelstoke in the absence of antidumping action is impossible to
determine. The lowest Japanese bids for Mica and Site One, how-
ever, exceeded the Soviet bids by 51%143 and 70%,144 respectively.
Calculating on the basis of the lowest potentially intervening Japa-
nese bids for Mica and Site One, the avoidable cost attributable to
antidumping measures for Revelstoke might have been as high as $9
to $11 million.145 The extra cost to B.C. Hydro would have repre-
sented an extra cost of the same magnitude to the country as a
whole. 146
Essentially similar considerations apply in computing the bur-
den of higher import prices in the Japanese generators case. The
antidumping investigation in the generators case concerned compet-
ing bids for four generator contracts. 147 B.C. Hydro awarded the
142. Id
143. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (2) and (5). See also supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
144. See supra note 95, Table 1, columns (2) and (5). See also supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
145. See supra note 95, Table I, columns (2) and (5). See also suprq notes 97-98 and
accompanying text.
146. This calculation disregards minor amounts of additional duties and taxes col-
lected on the difference in import prices.
147. Table 3
Four Contracts for Hydro-Electric Generators Won by Japanese Producers in
Competition with Canadian General Electric, 1975-79*
Winning Canadian
Name of Site Number of Bidders Bid Bid Potentially Intervening Bids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peace Site One 6 Mitsubishi CGE USSR Westinghouse ASEA Hitachi"
- S1000 20,800 17,553 16,600 17,800 31,034 24,700
- CGE = 100 119 100 95 101 177 firm price
Seven Mile 4 Hitachi CGE Mitsubishi** Toshiba**
-$I000 12,800 15,400 14,700 16,900
- CGE = 100 83 100 96 firm price
Revelstoke 8*** Fuji CGE Westinghouse Hitachi** Mitsubishi**Toshiba**
- $1000 28,480 35,265 33,319 25,698 27,584 28,850
- CGE = 100 firm price 100 95 73 78 82
Hind's Lake 5 Hitachi CGE AEG Fuji" Toshiba**
- $1000 2,240 2,820 3,440 3,235 2,460
- CGE = 100 firm price 100 122 115 87
Brief of Canadian General Electric Company Limited, Public Exhibit No. CGE-1, Generators Case, at
appendix (1980) [hereinafter cited as CGE Generators Brietl; B.C. Hydro, Complete List of Authority Gen-
erator Tenders and Awards (Dec. 10, 1979) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter cited as List of Gener-
ator Tenders].
*All prices include charges for installation, and are subject to escalation, except as noted.
**These are potentially intervening bids from other Japanese companies [as per readout]. Where dumping
was found on those bids, normal values should be substituted.
***Two of these bids are not presented in this table. MIL submitted one, quoting a $37,695,000 bid; the
Swedish producer ASEA submitted the other, at a bid price of $54,464,000. Both bids were subject to
escalation.
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first three contracts, and Newfoundland Hydro awarded the
fourth.148 Mitsubishi won the Site One contract, although CGE sub-
mitted the lowest bid. 49 While the price difference actually appears
to have been smaller than the 19% indicated by the bids, 50 B.C.
Hydro's willingness to accept the higher Japanese bid is evidence of
the utility's determination not to purchase any more CGE genera-
tors, which had performed so poorly at Portage Mountain. 51 It
must be recognized that non-price considerations can be a strong
factor in contract awards, and thus can complicate the analysis of the
potential effects of antidumping action. B.C. Hydro might have con-
tinued to import generators in the absence of Japanese dumping,
even if no potentially intervening bids with prices lower than CGE's
had been submitted. On the other hand, how much more B.C.
Hydro would have been willing to pay for imports, when faced with
the choice of buying CGE generators, cannot be determined.
There actually were two other bids lower than Mitsubishi's for
Site One, although one of these was marginally higher than
CGE's 5 2 In the absence of dumping, B.C. Hydro might have
awarded the contract to the Soviet trading agency, or to Westing-
house. Yet it is impossible to calculate the additional cost to B.C.
Hydro that such a move would have entailed, because the decision to
accept Mitsubishi's actual bid over the other two must have been
based on non-price considerations. In the case of the Seven Mile
generators, another complication arises. Although Mitsubishi's bid
for Seven Mile might appear to be a "potentially intervening bid" as
defined in the discussion of the Soviet turbines case, 5 3 the
antidumping ruling was directed against all hydroelectric generators
imported from Japan.'54 Thus, there is a possibility that the poten-
tially intervening bid would also have increased as a consequence of
148. See CGE Generators Brief, supra note 147, at appendix.
149. See supra note 147, Table 3, columns (2) and (3). In December 1976 B.C. Hydro
had awarded a fourth contract, for the Portage Mountain No. 10 generator, to Fuji. The
Tribunal, however, did not investigate that item, because B.C. Hydro had exercised an
option obtained under an earlier contract with the Japanese supplier. See Generators
Case, supra note 4, at 9.
150. See supra note 147, Table 3, columns (2) and (3).
151. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. During the Tribunal's public hearing
it was explained that CGE's bid departed from the terms of B.C. Hydro's tender call, and
that the cost of bringing the CGE bid up to specifications would have narrowed signifi-
cantly its price advantage over Mitsubishi. See 2 Transcript of Public Hearing, Genera-
tors Case, at 37, 275-77 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ADT Generators Transcript]. The
Tribunal called CGE "marginally the lower bidder" for Site One. Generators Case,
supra note 4, at 10.
152. See supra note 147, Table 3, columns (3), (4), and (5) and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
154. The Tribunal firmly rejected "the suggestion that certain individual Japanese
suppliers should be exempted." Generators Case, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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antidumping action. The same problem arises with Toshiba's bid for
the Hind's Lake contract. 55 In the case of the Revelstoke project,
however, at least Westinghouse's fifth-ranking bid, which can be
labelled a potentially intervening bid, was not threatened by
antidumping measures. If antidumping action had forced B.C.
Hydro to award the Revelstoke contract to Westinghouse, the addi-
tional cost of importing the equipment from the United States,
rather than from Japan, would have amounted to well over $5 mil-
lion, because Fuji had quoted a firm price, whereas the Westing-
house bid was subject to escalation. 56
Whether the importation of Japanese hydroelectric generators
might have continued, or will continue in the future, in spite of the
antidumping ruling remains uncertain. If Canadian utilities had
continued to import Japanese generators, the imports might have
cost more as a result of a decision preventing Japanese producers
from competing at dumped prices. The magnitude of this extra cost
is difficult to determine, but in 1980 the Tribunal reported that
"according to B.C. Hydro, an injury finding would have the practical
effect of precluding B.C. Hydro from future contracting with Japa-
nese suppliers, forcing it to deal with other foreign suppliers with
which it had no experience."' 57 B.C. Hydro may have had an interest
in dramatizing the potential effect of a decision that would prevent
Japanese suppliers from competing at dumped prices, as the author-
ity obviously prefers to pay lower rather than higher prices. B.C.
Hydro's prediction, however, might have been based on its insights
concerning the way in which Custom and Excise intended to use its
powers if the Tribunal found material injury.
The weighted average of the margins of dumping for the con-
tracts subject to the investigation amounted to 52% of export
prices.158 An official of Customs and Excise described the methodol-
ogy for determining the margin of dumping: "Where possible, the
normal values and export prices of the goods were determined under
sections 9 and 10 of the Anti-dumping Act respectively. However,
where insufficient information was provided, recourse was had to
section I." 159 The reference to Section 11 implies that a ministerial
155. See supra note 147, Table 3, column (6).
156. See supra note 147, Table 3, columns (2) and (4).
157. Generators Case, supra note 4, at 6. Incidentally, this quotation implies that buy-
ers' cost arguments might not be completely lost on the Tribunal.
158. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
159. Generators Case, supra note 4, at 6. Section I1 of the Anti-dumping Act states
that "the normal value or export price, as the case may be, shall be determined in such a
manner as the Minister prescribes, "if sufficient information has not been furnished or is
not available for a determination under Sections 9 and 10. Anti-dumping Act, CAN.
REv. STAT. ch. A-15, § 11 (1970). Sections 9 and 10 of the Act prescribe in detail the
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prescription was used in the generators case as well as in the turbines
case, apparently because the Japanese producers did not cooperate
to the Deputy Minister's satisfaction. The margin of 52% might have
been designed specifically to close the large gap between Fuji's price
for Revelstoke and the firm-price equivalent of CGE's bid.160 In any
event, available data suggest that B.C. Hydro would not have
imported generators from Japan for the Site One and Revelstoke
projects if a ministerial prescription raising all Japanese prices by
52% had been in effect during the 1975-79 period.1 61 Thus, those two
contracts presumably would have gone to third countries. Accepta-
ble third-country bids also might have been obtained for the Seven
Mile generators if the Japanese producers had been expected to bid
at much higher levels.
B.C. Hydro's prediction that the Tribunal's decision would
force it to deal with untried foreign suppliers of hydroelectric gener-
ators may prove to be correct. B.C. Hydro will therefore bear the
cost of changing suppliers, as well as the cost of higher import prices.
There will be no offsetting gains elsewhere in Canada, so the addi-
tional cost to B.C. Hydro will represent a net national burden caused
by the antidumping measures against generator imports from
Japan.162
C. INDIRECT INCOME TRANSFERS TO DOMESTIC PRODUCERS
CGE may not have expected to win any additional contracts for
turbines and generators if dumped imports from the Soviet Union
and Japan, respectively, were discontinued because of the imposition
of antidumping measures. The domestic producer still may have
had important reasons for obtaining antidumping protection. In
particular, CGE apparently was concerned about the effect of dump-
ing on prices for other contracts that the domestic producer hoped to
win. This concern about preserving price levels was expressed most
clearly in the CGE brief for the Japanese generators case:
there is not the slightest doubt whatsoever, in our appreciation of the market,
that the continuing presence in that market of suppliers bidding at dumped
formulae to be used to determine normal values and export prices in various circum-
stances. Id at §§ 9, 10.
160. The firm-price equivalent of CGE's bid is calculated by multiplying CGE's
actual bid by a factor of 1.22, which is the ratio of two Westinghouse bids for Revelstoke,
one firm and the other subject to escalation. The gap between the Fuji and CGE bids
would have been closed if Fuji's export price had been increased by 52%. This would
have entailed an effective increase of 59.8%, after considering the additional duty on the
price increase.
161. See supra note 147, Table 3.
162. This statement disregards minor adjustments that should be made for duties and
taxes. To the extent that higher import duties and taxes are collected because of higher
import prices, the burden to the country would be less than the burden to B.C. Hydro.
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prices has a real and depressing effect upon the prices at which domestic
manufacturers bid for the game awards and in particular of course upon the
prices at which they may succeed in obtaining awards in the face of dumped
competition. 16 3
The brief also raised the possibility that Hydro Quebec, the most
important customer for domestic hydroelectric equipment, might
not continue its preferential procurement policy, under which
domestic bids are preferred regardless of the magnitude of the price
advantages the utility might obtain by inviting foreign bids. The
brief concluded that "at the very least the domestic manufacturers
may well be expected to quote prices to Hydro Quebec which reflect
the presence of dumped Japanese competition in the Canadian mar-
ket generally." 16
Domestic producers commonly argue "price suppression" or
"price erosion" before the Tribunal, which has consistently indicated
that price erosion is an important factor in the determination of
material injury, and ought to be prevented when it is caused by
dumping. Price erosion presented a definite problem for the Cana-
dian turbine and generator producers at the time of the Tribunal's
investigation of those products.1 65 Although the suggestion that
Hydro Quebec might, indeed, discontinue its policy of eschewing
foreign bids is not to be considered seriously, dumping very well
might depress CGE's prices, even in the "assured" sector of the
domestic market. Hydro Quebec is apparently willing to subsidize
MIL and CGE by purchasing Canadian equipment. Therefore,
domestic producers can recover their "full" costs, and local workers
can earn more than they would if MIL and CGE competed directly
with foreign suppliers in the Quebec market. There appears to be a
limit, however, to the margin of preference that can be justified.
CGE must reduce its prices to competitive levels in Quebec, as well
as in the other provinces, if certain provincial utilities .are able to
procure equipment at significantly lower prices by taking advantage
of aggressive foreign bidding. The chief executive officer of CGE
explained the reason for this phenomenon in a reference to the pro-
vincial utilities:
they are Crown corporations and they live in fish-bowls, and anything that
any one of them does makes news in tomorrow's paper, whether it is Vancou-
163. CGE Generators Brief, supra note 147, at 17.
164. Id at 21. Note, this conclusion contains almost the exact wording as the conclu-
sion in DEW's brief in the Turbines Case. DEW Turbines Brief, supra note 95, at 23-24.
165. During the public hearing for the Generators Case, the Vice-President and Gen-
eral Manager of the Power Generation Department of CGE was questioned as to
whether the presence of dumping had led his company to lower its prices. His reply was:
"We certainly have bid lower than we would otherwise have bid." Counsel, however,
prevented the witness from giving details in public. 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra
note 151, at 86.
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ver, or Toronto, or wherever you want. So, they are very restricted in their
opportunity to exercise discretion. We need to go beyond what they can do.
This is why I think it is a national problem; it is a federal government
problem.166
CGE, therefore, must seek a way either to avoid reducing its prices,
or to restore its prices to a profitable level, without exceeding Hydro
Quebec's justifiable margin of preference. In order for CGE to
accomplish this end, provincial power authorities other than Hydro
Quebec must be forced, through antidumping measures, to pay
higher prices for their imports.
Thus, CGE can gain from antidumping action without winning
even a single additional contract. In this situation, antidumping
measures hide the true value of the subsidies that the domestic pro-
ducers receive from Hydro Quebec. This additional hidden subsidy,
which is made possible by removing dumped imports as a standard
of comparison, may be regarded as a pure income transfer. CGE
and MIL, or their workers, gain as much as Hydro Quebec, or the
Quebec public at large, loses by subsidizing domestic production.
The net national burden of this camouflaging action consists of the
increase in import prices that provincial power authorities other than
Hydro Quebec have to pay, plus the other costs related to protecting
the subsidies. 167
Deterrence of dumping by other foreign countries also results in
indirect transfers of income to domestic producers. The so-called
Ansaldo episode vividly illustrates that it is to CGE's advantage to
obtain antidumping protection, even if it could not hope to win addi-
tional B.C. Hydro contracts.
On the last day of the public hearings in the Japanese genera-
tors case, counsel for CGE read into the record the generator bids,
which had been opened on the previous afternoon, for Newfound-
land Hydro's Upper Salmon development. 168 The lowest bid had
been submitted by Ansaldo of Italy. 169 CGE submitted the second-
ranking bid, which was 36% higher than Ansaldo's. 170 There were
also four other bids from foreign producers; three were European,
and one was Japanese. 171 The prices exceeded Ansaldo's bid by up to
166. Minutes of Proc. and Evidence of the Sub-Comm on Import Pot)', Standing
Comm. on Fin, Trade, and Econ. Aff, Respecting: Proposals on Import Po!)', 32d Parl.
Ist Sess. 8:22 (1981) (Statement of Mr. Cartwight). [hereinafter cited as Minutes].
167. These costs include litigation, administration, and costs of "rent-seeking behav-
ior." For a discussion of "rent-seeking behavior" see Krueger, The Political Economy of
the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 291 (1974).
168. See 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 224-26.
169. Id at 224.
170. Id
171. Id
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111%. 172 Counsel for CGE stated that calculations by his client sug-
gested "unmistakably that there is a strong prima facie case that the
Ensaldo (sic) price is a deeply dumped price."' 73 He invited the Tri-
bunal to direct the Deputy Minister to initiate an investigation into
whether the Italian producer had dumped generators. 17 4 Counsel for
the Japanese producers immediately joined CGE's counsel in mak-
ing this request, and concluded:
What I'm saying, in effect, is that if that we're going to look at anybody who
has caused, is causing or is likely to cause material injury, that the scope of
the inquiry must necessarily be broad enough to include anyone, any and all
people, who are in the marketplace.' 75
Naturally, the Japanese producers' interests lay in extending the cov-
erage of the antidumping ruling, if they were aware that their case
was lost with regard to future imports.
As it happened, the Italian producer did not obtain the Upper
Salmon contract. The Deputy Minister expeditiously issued a
Notice of Investigation concerning hydroelectric generators from
Italy.176 The Notice referred to the Tribunal's recent finding con-
cerning Japanese generators, and suggested that the loss of the
Upper Salmon contract was likely to cause material injury to CGE.
Six months later, the Deputy Minister gave notice of his intention to
terminate the investigation, stating that "on June 12, 1980, the con-
tract under investigation . ..was awarded to the complainant,
Canadian General Electric" and consequently, there was no longer
evidence of potential injury to CGE.177 Apparently, Newfoundland
Hydro wished to avoid the prospect of becoming involved in an
antidumping case, and of having to pay an antidumping duty on the
Italian generators. The Tribunal's Japanese generators finding left
little doubt that dumped imports from Italy would be subject to
antidumping duty, even if a contract award could have been granted
prior to the Tribunal's decision on the new case. Furthermore, New-
foundland Hydro, not the Italian firm, would have been responsible
for paying the antidumping duty, because the authority had acted as
its own importer. 178
172. See id
173. Id at 225.
174. Id
175. Id at 226.
176. 114 CAN. GAz. 1841 (Part I, Mar. 7, 1980).
177. 114 CAN. GAz. 5943 (Part I, Sept. 27, 1980).
178. More experienced end users of potentially dumped goods tend to deal through
the Canadian-based importing agents of the foreign suppliers. The advantages of such
an arrangement follow from §§ 6 & 33(1) of the Anti-dumping Act, which state that
antidumping duties must be paid by the importer. Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REv. STAT.
ch. A-15, §§ 6, 33(1) (1970).
CANADIAN ANTID UMPING POLICY
The Ansaldo episode illustrates the general proposition that a
finding of material injury by the Tribunal, while narrowly focused
on dumped imports from a particular country, can deter dumping
from other countries. It appears, however, that CGE was not so cer-
tain that it could rely on the deterrent effect. Following the Deputy
Minister's Notice of Termination, the Canadian producer asked the
Tribunal to investigate the question of injury arising from, presuma-
bly, future dumping of generators by Italian producers.179 When the
Tribunal declined to initiate the requested investigation, CGE
appealed the Tribunars decision in the Federal Court. 80
Applying this experience to the turbines case might suggest that,
since the 1976 decision against the Soviet Union, other foreign pro-
ducers have abstained from dumping in the Canadian market. CGE
would have been expected to request that the Tribunal extend the
finding against the Soviet turbine-producers to other suppliers, if
there had been evidence of significant dumping of turbines in the
bidding for B.C. Hydro's Revelstoke project.' 8'
IV. THE NET NATIONAL BURDEN IN CASE OF
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
A. THE DOMESTIC BUYERS' SACRIFICE
When Newfoundland Hydro awarded the contract for the
Upper Salmon generators to CGE rather than Ansaldo, the cost of
the project increased by approximately $1 million.'8 2 This amount
represents the sacrifice the utility decided to make because Ansaldo's
bid had become an unattractive option as a result of the impending
antidumping action. Although the $1 million increase represents the
cost to Newfoundland Hydro of government intervention,
antidumping action did not necessarily cause a $1 million burden to
the country as a whole. The reason is that the Upper Salmon con-
tract did not involve continuing importation; rather it involved
179. See ADT ANN. REP., supra note 28, at 37, 41.
180. Id CGE later withdrew its appeal. 116 CAN. GAz. 5014 (Part I, Jul. 10, 1982).
In May 1982, CGE filed another complaint alleging injurious dumping of hydro genera-
tors by Ansaldo, id, although CGE had just won a contract for two generators for New-
foundland Hydro's Cat Arm development project over the Italian producer. Id at 5016.
National Revenue responded by initiating an investigation. Id at 5014-17. The Notice
of Investigation made it clear that price suppression was the basis for CGE's complaint:
"there is evidence that the continuing presence of allegedly dumped bids by Ansaldo in
the Canadian market has prevented the recovery of Canadian prices to the level which
prevailed prior to the Japanese dumping, now curtailed." Id at 5016. The case is not
expected to reach the Tribunal before the end of 1982.
181. The Ansaldo episode clearly foreshadowed the new procedures that have been
proposed to increase the deterrent effect of Canadian antidumping law. See Stegemann,
Special Import Measures, supra note 11.
182. See ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 224.
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"import substitution." CGE expected to benefit by winning the con-
tract award. Factors of production directly or indirectly employed
by CGE most likely also gained because of the additional order.
Thus, in the case of import substitution, the national burden or bene-
fit of antidumping action is computed by subtracting the producers'
gain from the buyers' loss. The focus of this subsection will be the
buyers' sacrifice. A demonstration of the calculation of the produ-
cers' gain in the case of import substitution, as well as a determina-
tion of the net burden or benefit to the country, will follow.
In the foregoing analysis of the continuing importation situa-
tion, data for turbine and generator contracts were used to quantify
the cost of antidumping action to importing provincial utility com-
panies, under the assumption that government intervention would
have caused buyers to switch to other foreign sources. The same
data now will be used to compute the cost of antidumping action to
domestic utilities under a radically different assumption. That
assumption is that antidumping action in each case would have
caused the domestic buyer to award the turbine or generator contract
in question to CGE rather than to a foreign producer. This assump-
tion renders considerations such as the existence of potentially inter-
vening bids, or the buyers' dissatisfaction with the domestic
producers' performance, less important than they were in the case of
continuing importation.183 At the very least, the evidence on dis-
puted past contracts indicates the magnitude of the sacrifice that
CGE must have expected the provincial power authorities to make
by purchasing domestic equipment rather than dumped imports.
As previously noted, both CGE (DEW) and the Soviet trading
agency submitted bids for the three disputed turbine projects; the
183. It is not surprising that this assumption accords with CGE's position on the
dumping question. II Canadian General Electric Company Limited, Submission to the
House of Commons' Sub-Committee on Import Policy (April 1981) [hereinafter referred
to as CGE Submission, Import Policy]. CGE asserted, "from 1975 to 1979 CGE lost four
major orders for hydro-electric generators to Japanese manufacturers" because of dump-
ing. Id at 6. CGE suggested that the Tribunal should not have accepted data on poten-
tially intervening bids as evidence that past dumping had not caused injury, unless it
could be established that these "intermediate" bids also were not dumped bids. Id at 65-
66.
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Soviet Union won all three contracts.'84 For these three projects,
DEW equipment and installation would have cost between 29% and
85% more than the Soviet equipment and installation. 185 If B.C.
Hydro had purchased its turbines for the Peace Site One project
from DEW rather than from EMEC, the authority would have paid
an additional $21.6 million on that contract alone.1 86
A comparison of the CGE bids and the winning Japanese bids
184. Table 4
Buyers' Sacrifice in Case of Import Substitution for Hydraulic Turbine Contracts,
1971-75*
Canadian Bid USSR Bid Difference Difference Non-Price Difference
Name of Site $1000 $1000 $1000 (2)=100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mica Creek* DEW Energomach all producers quoted firm
prices
firm bids $15,549 9,472 6,077 64
USSR design more compact
using higher strength steel
Peace Site One DEW EMEC DEW bid subject to
escalation and exceptions
bids subject to 39,691 22,122 17,569 79
escalation
firm EMEC bid and 47,000*** 25,384 21,616 85 EMEC quoted firm price and
DEW equivalent also subject to escalation
Mactaquac DEW EMEC DEW bid at readout
firm EMEC bid and 8,290*** 6,451 1,839 29 $7,000,000 subject to
DEW equivalent escalation
EMEC quoted firm price
USSR design preferred
DEW Turbines Brief, supra note 95.
*Prices include governors and installation.
"The Soviet Union shared the Mica Creek contract with Hitachi, the second lowest bidder.
***These are escalated DEW bids. For the Peace Site One bid, see 2 ADT Turbines Transcript,
supra note 95, at 52. The Mactaquac bid has been adjusted using the same proportion.
185. See supra note 184, Table 4, column (4).
186. See supra note 184, Table 4, column (3). B.C. Hydro chose EMEC's firm price
for the Site One project. The escalated DEW equivalent was named during the Tribu-
nal's hearing by Counsel for B.C. Hydro. See supra note 184, Table 4. The figure of $47
million is an ex ante estimate. It implies a total escalation factor of 18.4% of the global
bid for a period of at least 3-4 years from contract award to expected shipment. The
corresponding factor for the two EMEC bids is 14.7%. Id at columns (1) and (2).
326 CORNELL INTERN.ATIONAL L. JOURN.4L [Vol. 15:293
in the generators case suggests a similar conclusion.187 The percent-
age differences between the CGE and the Japanese prices range from
minus 16% to 61% of the Japanese prices. 8 8 At the time of the bid-
ding for the generator projects, B.C. Hydro was deeply dissatisfied
with the performance of generators supplied by CGE for the Portage
Mountain project.' 8 9 As a result, the authority was unwilling to
purchase any more CGE generators of the same design. Thus, B.C.
Hydro's sacrifice in buying CGE rather than Japanese generators
would have been greater than mere price differences indicate; it is
difficult to discern exactly how great the additional cost would have
been. The buyer's pure price sacrifice for the Revelstoke project
alone would have amounted to $17.4 million. 190 This figure
accounts for the fact that Fuji's price was firm, whereas CGE's bid
187. Table 5
Buyers' Sacrifice in Case of Import Substitution for
Hydroelectric Generator Contracts, 1975-79*
Canadian Bid Winning Bid Difference Difference Non-Price Differences
$1000 $1000 $1000 (2) = 100
Name of Site (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peace Site One CGE Mitsubishi CGE departed from terms
of tender call
17,553 20,800 -3,247 -16
difficulties with CGE design
Seven Mile CGE Hitachi CGE departed from terms
of tender call
15,400 12,800 2,600 20
difficulties with CGE design
Revelstoke CGE Fuji CGE departed from terms
of tender call
35,265 28,480F 17,400"* 61
Fuji quoted firm price
Hind's Lake CGE Hitachi CGE departed from terms
of tender call
2,820 2,240F 1,000** 45
Hitachi quoted firm price
See CGE Generators Brief, supra note 147; List of Generator Tenders, supra note 147.
*Prices include installation and are subject to escalation, except prices marked "F," which are firm
prices.
*The difference is based on an escalated CGE bid. For the method of computation, see infra note
190.
188. See supra note 187, Table 5, column (4). The negative difference for Peace Site
One indicates that the CGE bid was lower than the winning bid. See supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
190. See Public Exhibit No. MIL-1, Generators Case (hearings 1980) (letter from
Marine Industries Limited to the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce). The
$17.4 million difference between Fuji's firm bid and CGE's escalated price implies a total
escalation factor of 30.1% of CGE's global bid for a period of at least 5-6 years between
the contract award and the time of expected shipment. In the case of the Hind's Lake
project, the difference was computed by analogy to the escalation adjustment suggested
for Newfoundland's Upper Salmon project during the generator hearing. See supra note
187, Table 5, column (3).
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was subject to escalation. 191
B. THE DOMESTIC PRODUCERS' GAIN
The gain to domestic producers in the import substitution situa-
tion also will be calculated based on the assumption that, in the
absence of dumping, the disputed turbine and generator contracts
would have been awarded to CGE, or its subsidiary, DEW. CGE
has compiled its own estimate of the potential impact of the genera-
tor contracts that were the subject of the 1980 investigation:
In specific terms, we can document that Japanese dumping of these five
hydro-electric generator orders alone would have represented at least $75
million in sales to CGE and at least 1.2 million man-hours of work to
employees of our company alone. It should be understood in no uncertain
terms that this represents 600 man-years of unemployment that Japanese
manufacturers have 'exported' to Canada.
In addition, the impact which this dumping constitutes in terms of orders lost
to Canadian suppliers of materials such as copper bar, silicon steel, steel
plate and sheet, etc. (had these hydro-electric generators been manufactured
in Canada)... represents at least an equivalent number of man-years of
indirect employment by Canadian suppliers of these materials. 192
CGE estimated that the value of foregone employment earnings to
CGE employees was $15 million, as well as "at least that amount
again to employees of CGE's Canadian suppliers."' 93 The probable
loss to the federal and provincial governments of corporate, per-
sonal, and other tax revenues was estimated at $15 million. 94
Finally, CGE claimed that the loss in Canadian value added, adjust-
ing for multiplier effects, totaled $260 million. 95
In computing these losses or potential gains, CGE apparently
assumed that all Canadian resources that could have been employed
in domestic execution of the orders in question remained completely
idle when the contracts were awarded to foreign suppliers. In econo-
mists' terms, CGE assumed that the "opportunity cost" of producing
the five sets of generators domestically would have been zero. 96
191. It was observed earlier that CGE's prices probably would have been higher in the
absence of dumping. For this reason, the estimates in Table 4, supra note 184, and Table
5, supra note 187, must be regarded as the lower bounds of the sacrifice that CGE
expected the importing provincial utilities to make. The "price erosion" argument has
been reconfirmed by CGE. See CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 64.
192. CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 7. The CGE brief refers to 5
generator contracts, although only 4 were the subject of the Tribunal's investigation. See
supra note 149.
193. Id at 8.
194. Id
195. Id
196. "Opportunity cost" in this case is defined as the value of other goods and services
that would not have been produced if the resources in question had been used to make
the five sets of generators domestically.
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This is an extreme assumption, and it implies that the net national
benefit of import substitution is very great. Indeed, the benefit,
where the opportunity cost is zero, equals the cost of imports; that is,
each dollar spent on imported generators would represent a dollar
wasted, from the national point of view. 197
It would be equally extreme to assume that the domestic produ-
cers' prices were exactly equal to the opportunity cost of domestic
production. This assumption would imply that all factors of produc-
tion, firms, capital owners, and tax collectors, received just as much
for other work as they would have received if CGE had won the
disputed generator contracts. Under this assumption the domestic
producers' gain obviously would have been zero, and the net
national burden of import substitution would have been equal to the
domestic buyers' sacrifice. 198
Presumably, the opportunity cost of producing the five sets of
generators domestically would have fallen between the two
extremes. Thus, domestic producers as well as the tax collectors
would have gained something if CGE had won the disputed con-
tracts. These total gains, however, would have been less than the
sales value of the contracts. The crucial question is whether the pro-
ducers' and tax collectors' gains from import substitution would
have been larger than the buyers' losses. Unfortunately, this ques-
tion can not be approached directly, because no concrete figures for
the opportunity cost of producing equivalent hydroelectric equip-
ment domestically are available. 199
The estimates that CGE provided in its brief to the Sub-Com-
mittee on Import Policy can be used in combination with other avail-
able information to demonstrate approximately how the total value
of the five generator contracts would have been shared among vari-
ous domestic participants, if those contracts had been awarded to
197. See infra § IV(C) and note 222 for a discussion of the various ways of calculating
the net national burden or benefit of import substitution.
198. In this case, the net national burden for the four contracts listed in Table 5 would
be equal to the buyer's price sacrifice in column (3) adjusted for non-price differences,plus duty collected on the imported generators. See supra note 187, Table 5, column (3).
199. See infra notes 222-44 and accompanying text, for a discussion of what evidence
is available.
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CGE.2°° An examination of six important categories reveals that
any claims that the total sales value could have been added to gross
national product (GNP) is tenuous at best. Furthermore, a more
detailed discussion of conceptual problems makes it possible to spec-
ify the information that is required to quantify the social opportunity
cost of import substitution.
Transportation costs are the first category that has to be consid-
ered.201 Assume Canadian made generators were transported from
-Ontario or Quebec to the relevant power site by domestic carriers. If
these carriers had spare capacity, the national gain from the genera-
tor shipments would have been equal to the freight revenue minus
any incremental costs. If, in the absence of the generator orders, the
carriers were employed at full capacity, a gain could have arisen
only to the extent that the difference between freight revenue and
incremental cost would have been larger for the transportation of
generators than for the "next best" alternative use of the transport
facilities. Indeed, the social cost of shipping the generators conceiva-
bly could have been greater than the freight paid if the freight rates
understated the true opportunity cost, or shadow price, of using the
facilities. In some instances, hydroelectric equipment, such as partly
assembled turbines, would have to be shipped from the East to Brit-
ish Columbia sites via the Panama Canal. The use of such a lengthy
route would be due to "bottlenecks" which prevent bulky loads from
200. Table 6
Potential Gains for Domestic Producers as Implied by CGE's Calculations
for Five Hydroelectric Generator Contracts
($ million)
*(I) Freight 5.0
**(2) Installation (subcontractors' share and local labour) 10.0
***(3) Wages and Salaries of CGE Employees 15.0
***(4) Wages and Salaries of Employees of CGE's Canadian Suppliers 15.0
(5) Taxes (excluding taxes that would have been paid by employees) 9.0
(6) Residual for Overhead, Profit, and Imports of CGE and its
Canadian Suppliers 21.0
****(7) Total Value of Contracts at CGE's Prices 75.0
*This is a rough estimate based on information for one contract.
*These installation prices can be inferred from CGE Generators Brief, supra note
147, at appendix; List of Generator Tenders, supra note 147. For line (2) it has been
assumed that two thirds of total installation costs would go to subcontractors and
local labor and the remaining third would go to CGE employees and overhead.
***See CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 7-8. It is assumed, for the
computation of taxes in line (5), that the taxes on employment income in lines (3)
and (4) would have amounted to 20% of the total, or $6 million.
****See CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 7-8. Prices as tendered dur-
ing 1975-79 would have been subject to escalation.
201. See supra note 200, Table 6, line (1).
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passing overland. In that situation, the domestic portion of the
freight from a West coast port to the B.C. Hydro site would have
been nearly identical for both domestic and imported equipment.
The sea freight would be treated as an import cost in any event. For
these reasons, the total freight paid for shipping the domestic equip-
ment to British Columbia might be regarded as an opportunity cost
to the country, and no national gain could be claimed on this
account.
Similar considerations apply to the cost of installation.20 2
Assume that installing imported equipment requires as much sub-
contracting and local labor as does the installation of domestic
equipment. In this situation, the domestic producers can claim no
gain. If the installation of domestic equipment would have required
more local work, a gain would accrue only if the local resources
would otherwise have been idle, or less productively employed. For
instance, in the Soviet turbines case, the installation of CGE turbines
would have put more local people to work than the Soviet design,
because the CGE turbines were more bulky. Given the notorious
tightness of British Columbia's construction labor market, it seems
safe to conclude that little benefit would have resulted from the addi-
tional installation work if CGE had won the disputed contracts.
CGE submitted figures on wages and salaries20 3 to support its
claim that, in dumping generators, Japanese manufacturers
"exported" at least 1200 man-years of unemployment to Canada. In
CGE's view, import substitution could have created domestic
employment worth $30 million in additional earnings to domestic
labor.204 The CGE figures, however, may vastly overstate the poten-
tial gains from producing the disputed generators in Canada. Even
if materials suppliers had hired an additional 600 man-years of labor
to satisfy CGE's additional requirements, a large proportion of this
labor presumably would have been hired away from other employ-
ment, as unemployment tended to be low among the highly skilled
workers required by the material supplies industries. Thus, the
wages of CGE's suppliers' labor could, for the most part, be elimi-
nated from the list of potential national gains.
Similarly, the wages of CGE's employees would be less of a fac-
tor in computing the national gain if CGE had created 600 man-
years of additional employment by expanding its work force of high-
ly skilled personnel. In the late 1970's, the Canadian electrical
industry was "suffering from a shortage of highly-skilled exper-
202. See supra note 200, Table 6, line (2).
203. See supra note 200, Table 6, lines (3) and (4).
204. Id
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ienced tradesmen and technical workers which is expected to become
more pressing over the next three to five years."20 5 Thus, if CGE
had hired new skilled workers, little additional employment would
have resulted overall. It is not likely that any permanent layoffs by
CGE would have created unemployment, because skilled labor was
in great demand by other employers that were located close to
CGE's plants. Claims of a potential increase in employment would
look different, however, if they addressed the hiring of unskilled
labor or the avoidance of temporary layoffs.
Whether or not it is valid to consider wages of CGE's employees
in computing the potential national gains thus depends on how CGE
arrived at its figure of 600 man-years of additional employment.
During the Tribunal's hearing, the General Manager of CGE's
Power Generation Department conceded that his company would
not have had the capacity to produce the additional five sets of gen-
erators covered by the disputed contracts. He did contend, however,
that "the extremely long cycle of the design and manufacture of
hydro generators. . . brings with it an element of flexibility in both
planning and carrying out of the hiring and training of personnel
and the putting in place of additional key machine tools and other
facilities. '20 6 At least some of the 600 man-years thus would have
consisted of newly hired skilled personnel; these man-years would
have had an opportunity cost approximately equal to the wages paid
by CGE. The General Manager's testimony emphasized that expan-
sion of capacity would have been required only to alleviate bottle-
necks in CGE's design and manufacturing operations.20 7 In other
words, while the execution of additional orders would have required
CGE to hire some skilled labor and to expand physical facilities,
these orders also would have permitted a greater utilization of
existing personnel and facilities.
One should thus distinguish three categories of labor. The first
consists of those workers who might not have been laid off tempora-
rily if CGE had won the additional orders. These workers had
almost no social opportunity cost because they did not consider seek-
205. DEP'T OF INDUSTRY TRADE AND COMMERCE, REPORT BY THE SECTOR TASK
FORCE ON THE CANADIAN ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 25 (1978). For a discussion of the
broader picture of skilled trade shortages, see EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION
CANADA, LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980'S 159-70 (1981).
206. Statement by Mr. Waiter R. Fell on behalf of Canadian General Electric Lim-
ited, Public Exhibit No. CGE-5, Generators Case, at 20 (hearings 1980) [hereinafter
referred to as Fell Statement]. See also 1 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at
21-89 (public portion of cross-examination).
207. See Fell Statement, supra note 206, at 21.
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ing other employment during CGE's temporary lay-offs. 208 Other
workers who actually lost their jobs at CGE might have had an
opportunity cost lower than the wages that CGE would have paid,
because they had acquired job-specific skills, which were worth less
in alternative employment. Finally, a third category of workers,
which CGE retained only because the "costs to the business of laying
off people and attempting to replace them at a later time is very
high,"209 might have been used more productively if the company
had won the additional orders. The measure of CGE's opportunity
cost for this category of labor is the value of output that would have
been foregone if these workers had been used to execute the genera-
tor orders that CGE claims it lost because of Japanese dumping. A
more productive use of underemployed labor would have resulted in
a gain to CGE;210 CGE employees also might have benefited by
overtime pay, productivity-related premiums, and promotions.
Similar considerations apply to the utilization of existing physi-
cal facilities.211 If a machine had excess capacity, the opportunity
cost of using it for the additional generator orders would have
amounted to the cost of fuels, wear and tear, and additional mainte-
nance. If other work employed the machine to capacity, CGE still
might have given the production of additional generators priority.
In that case, the measure of the opportunity cost of using the
machinery would have been either the value of the output replaced
by the disputed contracts, or the additional cost of producing the
replaced output in some other fashion. If CGE could not avoid its
prior commitments, or if sacrificing those commitments would have
been too costly, the opportunity cost of producing the generators
might have included the costs of subcontracting, importing compo-
nents, or using additional facilities. 212
208. See 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 24-32, 59. Much of the
specific evidence on CGE's layoffs was revealed only in camera.
209. Fell Statement, supra note 206, at 10.
Mr. Fell notes that the "learning curve requires from two to five years to develop the
level of skills necessary for this type of manufacturing." Id See also Arrow, The Eco-
nomic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REvIEw OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 155 (1961-
62).
210. This gain should be included in the category of residual for overhead. Seesupra
note 200, Table 6, line (6).
211. Id
212. The residual in line (6) of Table 6 thus designates the maximum potential net
gain to the domestic producer, and its suppliers, from winning the disputed contracts.
See supra note 200. Subtracting the opportunity cost of using the existing facilities, the
cost of alleviating bottlenecks, and the cost of importing components and services from
the residual gain yields a more accurate approximation of the domestic producer's gain.
The import content of CGE generators appears to be low, as Mr. Fell testified, "For
nearly forty years, C.G.E. has carried out all engineering and manufacturing work for its
hydro generators, with over 95% Canadian content in its products." Fell Statement,
supra note 206, at 3.
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Finally, CGE's estimate of the potential tax gain constitutes a
benefit only to the extent that its $9 million figure represents a net
increase in tax revenues, 213 rather than a substitution for taxes that
either accrued on alternative outputs or were paid on Japanese
imports.
Data that would permit a conclusive determination of the gain
that CGE could have made by executing the additional generator
contracts are not available. The Tribunal's proceedings, however,
provide indirect evidence suggesting that the potential gain might
have been substantial. This indirect evidence pertains to CGE's
pricing policy in export markets. CGE introduced evidence on
export markets to demonstrate the threat of future injury from Japa-
nese dumping in the Canadian market. The evidence indicated a
growing discrepancy between Japanese production capacity and Jap-
anese demand for hydroelectric generators, as well as increasingly
aggressive Japanese bidding for projects in third countries during the
late 1970's.214 A CGE witness concluded:
The continuous low price bidding of the Japanese manufacturers requires
other manufacturers, as a matter of survival, to attack this low price strategy.
As a result,. . . each manufacturer will seek to meet the Japanese prices on
an occasional project but are [sic] unable to sustain a competitive position
against such a continuous barrage.2 15
It may be inferred that market conditions occasionally forced CGE,
as well as other producers, to match Japanese prices in export mar-
kets.216 Thus, the company might have gained substantially if it had
been able to replace some of its export orders with domestic con-
tracts. Given protection against Japanese dumping in the Canadian
market, CGE presumably could have obtained domestic contracts at
prices well in excess of the aggressive Japanese prices that the com-
pany had to contend with in third country export markets.
In the 1970's, export shipments accounted for approximately
40% of CGE's total shipments of hydrogenerators. The Canadian
subsidiary is regarded as "the technology leader for the General
Electric organization worldwide" in this field.21 7 CGE claimed,
however, that its successful export business could not continue
213. See supra note 200, Table 6, line (5).
214. See, eg., Statement by Mr. Gordon E. Drew on Behalf of Canadian General
Electric, Public Exhibit No. CGE-7, Generators Case, at 1, 16 (hearings, 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Drew Statement].
215. I at 16. See also 1 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 206-21
(statement); 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 107-45 (cross-
examination).
216. See Bid Prices for Hydro Generators-Exports, Public Exhibit No. CGE-10, Gen-
erators Case. For a list of 14 export orders for hydrogenerators that CGE won during
1970-79, see CGE Generators Brief, supra note 147, at appendix.
217. Fell Statement, supra note 206, at 3.
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"unless C.G.E. is able to obtain a substantial volume of orders from
the Canadian domestic utilities. '21 8 Given worldwide excess capac-
ity for heavy electrical equipment, it appears to be inevitable that
incremental-cost pricing will prevail for the foreseeable future in
markets that are open to foreign bidding. CGE expects that by
invoking the Anti-dumping Act against Japanese manufacturers of
hydrogenerators, it can protect itself in all regions of the domestic
market against aggressive competition "at prices which appear to
bear no relationship whatever to normal cost structures or profit
requirements." 21
9
CGE regards a secure domestic market as a prerequisite to
future growth of its capacity. As the General Manager of CGE's
Power Generation Department observed during the Tribunal's
hearing:
in making a presentation to our board of directors for additional equipment
and facilities, we get more attention when we talk about the Canadian
domestic market than about some speculative market worldwide .... The
Canadian domestic market is much more important to us from the point of
view of forward planning and credibility.220
Domestic producers presumably hope that the antidumping ruling
will, in addition to increasing their share of domestic orders at more
lucrative prices, prevent "price erosion" in areas of the market that
would have been relatively safe without the Tribunal's decision.
Prevention of "price erosion" can be expected even if antidumping
measures would not enable producers to secure any additional
domestic sales.22 '
C. THE NET BURDEN OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
There are two essentially equivalent definitions of the net
national burden or benefit of import substitution. One calculation of
the net national burden of import substitution involves subtracting
the buyer's loss from the producer's gain, then adjusting for differ-
ences in duties and taxes collected. The result of this calculation
represents a national "burden" if the buyer's loss exceeds the pro-
ducer's gain, and a "benefit" if the producer's gain exceeds the
buyer's loss, after adjusting for differences in duties and taxes. Alter-
natively, the net burden or benefit of import substitution can be
determined by comparing the social opportunity cost of the replaced
imports with the social opportunity cost of producing substitute
goods domestically. The following discussion of the net burden of
218. Id at 23.
219. Id at 24.
220. 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 58.
221. See supra § 111(C).
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import substitution employs the latter approach.222
This discussion will continue to disregard the administrative
costs of litigating and implementing antidumping measures, which
can be substantial. Furthermore, no attempt will be made to intro-
duce equity considerations. Thus, the analysis is based on the
assumption that a dollar gained by domestic producers or tax collec-
tors is as valuable in terms of national welfare as a dollar sacrificed
by domestic buyers.223 To simplify the presentation, assume that
incremental import duties and incremental taxes may be ignored,
because both amounts are either trivial or roughly cancel out.
Assume also that the prices of all inputs that the domestic producer
can employ or lay off reflect the inputs' marginal social opportunity
cost. These assumptions permit an analysis of the net burden or
benefit of import substitution, based on a comparison between for-
eign bid prices and the domestic producer's private opportunity cost.
Reliable information on the social or private opportunity cost of
domestic production is not generally available. Under its current
mandate, the Anti-dumping Tribunal does not concern itself with
investigating the national benefit or burden that can be expected to
result from its decisions. The Tribunal concerns itself solely with the
222. It is easy to show that the two definitions are equivalent. According to our first
definition, the net benefit or burden of import substitution (NB) can be expressed as:
(1) NB=PG-BS-DI+DT
The definition simply says that the net benefit or burden is equal to the difference
between producers' gain (PG) and buyers' sacrifice (BS), minus the amount of import
duty (DI) that the government collected on the imports in question, plus any incremental
domestic taxes (DT) that would have been collected had these imports been replaced by
domestic production. The buyers' sacrifice is defined as the difference between the prices
that buyers would have paid for domestic goods if dumping had been prevented (PD)
and the prices that buyers actually paid for imports in the absence of intervention (PI).
See supra note 182 and accompanying text. Thus:
(2) BS = PD- PI.
The prices should include transportation and installation costs in all cases. Further-
more, note that the definition of buyers' sacrifice disregards "welfare triangles." This
definition assumes that price differences of the relevant magnitude do not affect the
quantity of turbines and generators demanded by provincial utilities.
The domestic producers' gain is defined as the difference between their prices (PD) and
their private opportunity cost (OC). Thus:
(3) PG = PD- OC.
By substituting (2) and (3) into (1) we obtain:
(4) NB = (PD -OC) -(PD -PI) -DI + DT,
or
(5) NB = (PI -DI) -(OC -DT).
Equation (5) represents the second definition in the text, as (PI - DI) is the social oppor-
tunity cost of imports, and (OC - DT) is the social opportunity cost of domestic produc-
tion, assuming that the prices of all variable inputs reflect the marginal social opportunity
costs of these inputs.
223. This assumption implies that it is unnecessary in this context to discuss questions
such as "why should consumers of electricity in British Columbia subsidize producers of
hydroelectric equipment in Ontario and Quebec"?
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question of whether import-competing domestic producers would be
better off in the absence of dumping. This determination is made
without regard to the cost to domestic buyers, or to the national
interest. Although much of the evidence considered by the Tribunal
under its present mandate is also relevant to the net national burden
of antidumping measures, decisive quantitative evidence usually is
discussed only in the Tribunal's in camera sessions. The following
summary of a confidential comparative analysis of the contracts for
the Mica Creek and Peace Site One turbines, however, is available in
the Canadian producer's public brief for the turbines case: "In each
case, the estimated Russian F.O.B. factory price was less than 40% of
D.E.W.'s F.O.B. factory price and was approximately equal to
D.E.W.'s material costs only. '224
This evidence on factory prices suggests that in the turbines case
import substitution would not have been in the national interest. If
the Soviet exporter sold turbines at prices approximately equal to
DEW's material costs, turbines of equivalent quality could not have
been produced in Canada at a lower social opportunity cost. Any
utilization of physical facilities that had an alternative use, and any
employment of highly skilled production labor, would have been
wasteful from a national point of view, because similar turbines
could have been imported at the cost of materials only.
CGE and its subsidiary, DEW, cited the above evidence to
emphasize the seriousness of the domestic producer's situation, and
concluded: "It is for sound and obvious reasons that D.E.W. fears
for the continued existence of its hydraulic turbine business and con-
templates the disappearance of that business if Russian dumping
continues without the imposition of Anti-dumping duties. ' 225
Given the chronic state of excess production capacity in the
world market, terminating its turbine business might have been a
realistic alternative for CGE. Even if the Soviet exporter, after pay-
ing its "entrance fee," had raised its price to the market level, which
is generally determined by the Japanese, CGE still would not have
been able to sell in the open sector of the Canadian market at prices
high enough to cover its full, or long run, costs. Hydro Quebec,
which buys only from domestic producers, is expected to have
diminishing requirements for hydro equipment in the future. More-
over, the utility might become tired of supporting two domestic
producers.
224. ADT Turbines Brief, supra note 95, at 18. According to Pratten, materials and
components account for about 45% of the total production costs of turbo generators.
C.F. PRATrEN, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 198 (1971). This
implies that the domestic producer's prices were set to cover at least its full cost.
225. ADT Turbines Brief, supra note 95, at 19.
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CGE could hope to preserve its heavy electrical equipment
business at its present scale, or at any scale, only by invoking the
protection of the Anti-dumping Act, and forcing all provincial utili-
ties to accept at least Japanese domestic prices, plus a 15% normal
import duty. Although these considerations provide an adequate
explanation of CGE's reasons for seeking antidumping protection,
they do not explain why such protection might be in the national
interest.
D. THE POSSIBILITY OF MARKET FAILURE
Import substitution would have created a net national benefit if
the domestic producers' opportunity cost of providing equivalent
turbines and generators had been lower than the prices that domestic
buyers paid for the imported equipment.226 The evidence cited by
CGE in the turbines case suggests that, in that case, the opportunity
cost of domestic production would have exceeded the prices paid for
imports; import substitution thus would have resulted in a net
national burden.227
For the generators case, no such direct evidence is available. It
is worthwhile, however, to use the circumstances of the generators
case to explore the conditions under which importation might have
occurred, even though the opportunity cost of domestic production
would have been lower than the prices paid for imports. This situa-
tion is termed "market failure"; if it had occurred, it could have
resulted in importation that was wasteful from a national point of
view. Market failure in this context means that the domestic pro-
ducer, who lost several generator contracts to foreign bidders, quoted
prices that were too high from society's point of view. The following
discussion concerns the potential reasons for market failure. The
essential question is why it might have beeh in the interest of the
domestic producer to quote the prices it did, although the producer
could have secured additional contracts at prices that would have
covered more than its short-run opportunity cost.228
The domestic producer's behavior in quoting the prices it did
was probably not a result of underestimating the potential agressive-
226. Import substitution results in a national benefit if (PI - DI) > (OC - DT). As we
have assumed in the text that DI and DT are either negligible or roughly equal to each
other, a national benefit results if PI > OC, or OC < PI. See supra note 222, equation
(5).
227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
228. For a more abstract discussion of this point, see K. STEGEMANN, MONOPOLY AS A
DOMESTIC DISTORTION UNDER FREE TRADE CONDITIONS, (Institute of Economic
Research Discussion Paper No. 379, 1980); K. STEGEMANN, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF
MONOPOLY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY (Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper
No. 492, 1982).
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ness of foreign competitors. Although CGE could not have known
in advance exactly how low it would have had to bid in order to win
a particular contract, CGE's experts, in preparing any major tender,
work diligently to find out what the market level is:
We have to look at those people who are qualified to bid, very often there is a
pre-qualification and we do know who is going to be bidding and we look
back at their past practice in the recent periods and look at our estimations of
their shop loadings and see where they might be. Believe me, sometimes we
do very well in our estimates.2
29
The Canadian company and its United States parent have been
active and successful participants in international hydroelectric
equipment markets for many years. Therefore, it is hardly believa-
ble that these companies miscalculated on all the turbine and gener-
ator contracts investigated by the Tribunal. Nor could such a
miscalculation explain the large recorded price differentials.
At an early stage, CGE may have miscalculated its bids by over-
estimating the deterrence value of Canadian antidumping policy. In
1971, CGE apparently threatened the Canadian agent of the Japa-
nese generator producer Fuji with an antidumping complaint during
the bidding for the Portage Mountain project.230 CGE's bid for the
Portage Mountain Number 9 generator was 45% higher than
Fuji's.233 Apparently, the threat failed, as B.C. Hydro awarded the
contract to Fuji soon after.232 It was only eight years later that CGE
succeeded in activating the Anti-dumping Act against future imports
of Japanese generators.233 At that time the domestic producer also
succeeded in discouraging Newfoundland Hydro from awarding a
generator contract to Ansaldo of Italy, whose price was 36% lower
229. 2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 122 (testimony by Mr. Walter
R. Fell).
230. During the generator hearing, counsel for the Japanese manufacturers intro-
duced a letter that the Canadian agent for Fuji had received in December 1971:
Re: Portage Mountain Development
Generator 9
B.C. Hydro Contract 180.
Dear Sir,
We act on behalf of Canadian General Electric Company Limited. We are
advised that our client has discussed with the Assistant Deputy Minister of
National Revenue, Customs Division, Ottawa, your bid for Generator 9 for the
Portage Mountain Development. Our client was informed that the Department
of National Revenue was prepared to conduct a full investigation under the pro-
visions of Canadian anti-dumping laws on receipt of a formal complaint.
We will advise our client to register such a complaint in the event that your
tender is successful.
2 ADT Generators Transcript, supra note 151, at 153.
231. See List of Generator Tenders, supra note 147.
232. Id The Japanese producer's name has been used in the text to simplify identifi-
cation of a bid. The B.C. Hydro contract for the Fuji generator was in fact awarded to
Nissho-Iwai Canada Ltd., of Vancouver.
233. See Generators Case, supra note 4.
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than CGE's. 234
Despite the low deterrence value of the Anti-dumping Act with
regard to the importation of generators before the Tribunal's 1980
finding, the existence of the Act may have provided a reason for
CGE to continue bidding at prices that were higher than desirable
from society's point of view. Assume that CGE had an opportunity
cost low enough to make additional contracts marginally lucrative at
prices that were low enough to meet the foreign competition. In that
situation, CGE might not have had an interest in cutting prices,
because the company hoped to gain more in the long run by invok-
ing antidumping protection. CGE may have found it necessary to
claim lost contracts if it wished to claim material injury. Evidence of
profits lost due to "price suppression" on contracts that CGE won
might not have been enough to persuade the Tribunal that
antidumping protection was warranted.235
In the case of antidumping protection, there thus may exist a
"moral hazard" problem that is familiar from the literature on com-
mercial insurance.236 The problem is that the insured party may not
have an incentive to prevent or reduce damage that is covered by
insurance when the cost of prevention would be less than that of the
damage. Thus, more damage occurs with insurance than would
occur without insurance. In the context of antidumping policy,
domestic producers may decide to forego contracts that would have
been advantageous from a social point of view. They have to "lose"
a certain number of contracts before they can expect the antidump-
ing authorities to validate the producers' "right" to charge higher
prices in all regions of the domestic market than they would in inter-
national markets.
/-- Even if CGE's opportunity cost indeed was lower than the
prices paid for imported hydro equipment, there is another possible
reason that might explain why the domestic producer refused to
meet foreign prices in those parts of the domestic market that were
open to import competition, and that reason is not related to the
existence of the Anti-dumping Act. CGE might have expected
repercussions in other parts of the market, and particularly in Que-
bec, if the company had tried to secure B.C. Hydro contracts by
selective price cutting. CGE has been concerned about "price ero-
234. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
235. In the end, it was the hypothetical threat of future loss of contracts that brought
about the Tribunal's finding of likelihood of future injury. See supra notes 50-55, 77-85
and accompanying text.
236. See K. ARROW, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RIsK-BEARING (1965); Pauly, Over-
insurance and the Public Provision ofInsurance The Roles of Moral Hazard andAdverse
Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44, 44-62 (1974).
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sion" in relatively safe parts of the market as a result of dumping.237
If CGE had decided to meet low import prices in British Columbia,
Hydro Quebec and other utilities would have been pressured to
insist that CGE's prices also be reduced for its loyal, or captive, cus-
tomers. This price erosion in other parts of the domestic market
could have reduced substantially the marginal revenue that CGE
might have obtained by cutting prices in areas open to import com-
petition. It is plausible, therefore, that CGE's expected marginal
revenue was less than its opportunity cost, even if the prices to be
met exceeded the opportunity cost of producing the equipment
domestically.
This type of market failure occurs where the domestic producer
enjoys a preferred position in certain provinces. Price erosion in the
protected areas of the market may be a function of the company's
own defensive price cutting in "open" areas, rather than a function
of aggressive price cutting by foreign suppliers alone. To this extent,
market failure is independent of the Anti-dumping Act. If concern
about repercussions in other provinces had been CGE's only reason
for not meeting the unusually low foreign prices in British Colum-
bia, CGE's most rational option would have been to withdraw from
the battleground, because the preparation of tenders for custom-
designed hydroelectric equipment is very costly. The fact that CGE
continued bidding on B.C. Hydro tenders without any reasonable
hope of winning a contract suggests very strongly that CGE's objec-
tive was to activate antidumping protection.2 38
The likelihood of market failure becomes more remote if the
domestic producer has export opportunities. CGE has always been
active in export markets for hydroelectric equipment. 239 One aspect
of the export market business that CGE understandably dislikes is
the tendency of export prices to fall below full cost because of world-
wide excess capacity. From a national point of view, however, a
domestic company's sale at Japanese prices in South America is just
as valuable as replacing Japanese imports with domestic products in
British Columbia. Differences in transport costs to the two markets
might even favor export sales. Given such export opportunities, it
237. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
238. MIL, the other domestic producer, which was not a complainant before the Tri-
bunal, made the decision not to participate in tenders that were open to aggressive for-
eign competition. Note, however, that it is very hard for any bidder to know in advance
who else will participate in a tender. Furthermore, firms unwilling or unable to make a
bid with a chance of winning still may bid to leave their "visiting card," because they
expect to do business with the same customer on future occasions. On the reasons why
MIL discontinued bidding on turbine tenders open to Soviet participation, see 1 ADT
Turbines Transcript, supra note 95, at 188-91.
239. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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becomes almost impossible for CGE's opportunity cost to be less
than the cost of B.C. Hydro's imports.2 40
Intra-industry trade thus helps to prevent market failure, which
might result from a producer's monopoly power in the domestic
market. CGE finds it desirable to force B.C. Hydro to pay full-cost
prices by eliminating aggressive competition from foreign producers
in the Canadian market. Yet, such import replacement would not
increase national welfare, because B.C. Hydro would lose at least as
much as CGE would gain. Government intervention thus cannot be
justified on efficiency grounds when the domestic producer is in a
position to export at roughly the same prices at which imports are
being bought.
There appear to be some doubts, however, concerning CGE's
ability to export. In 1980, the Tribunal supported its finding of
future injury in the generators case by noting that:
CGE has recently suffered a slump in the acquisition of new export business.
As a result, foreign orders now booked will have been almost fully processed
by 1981....
In view of the long lead times from tender award to manufacturing activity
and the present state of CGE's order book it seems almost inevitable that in a
couple of years CGE will find itself with much of its generator capacity
unutilized.24 1
There are various possible explanations for CGE's failure to
acquire more new export business. One possibility is that the com-
pany was less willing to meet deteriorating world market prices
because it was counting on additional domestic orders, which are
more lucrative than export orders. Thus, CGE's anticipation of
antidumping protection may have contributed to its expectation that,
without increased protection, it would suffer from low utilization of
its production capacity. Another possibility is that CGE's pricing
behaviour in export markets was constrained by unwritten arrange-
ments limiting the aggressiveness of western producers. In a recent
brief, CGE refers to the existence of an international cartel:
"Reports have circulated for several years that the International
Electrical Association, whose membership consists of many of the
non-North American manufacturers of heavy apparatus, functions
as a cartel to allocate orders between its members and to set prices
for up to nine major product groupings of heavy apparatus."242 The
240. Indeed, CGE's opportunity cost might be higher than the cost of imports, as the
company appears to be able to export at prices exceeding Japanese world-market prices,
because its contracts are tied to Canadian development aid. See 2 ADT Generators
Transcript, supra note 151, at 74.
241. Generators Case, supra note 4, at 12.
242. CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 23. On the existence of inter-
national price agreements for heavy electrical equipment, see Epstein, Power Plant and
Free Trade, in REALIEs OF FREE TRADE: Two INDUSTRY STUDIES 113-17 (D. Bum
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author has no evidence as to whether the international General Elec-
tric organization has felt obliged to show similar restraint, and has
refrained from meeting unusually aggressive Japanese prices in cer-
tain markets. CGE appears to be more reluctant than some produ-
cers, however, to secure export orders by using certain commercial
practices euphemistically referred to as "commissions." "For exam-
ple, there have been allegations in the media that large non-North
American electrical manufacturers made 'payoffs and kickbacks' of
up to $140 million to secure the Itaipu hydro-electric contract in
South America. Canadian General Electric tendered unsuccessfully
on this project."2 43 If the domestic producer's export opportunities
indeed have vanished because of such constraints, it might be in the
national interest to replace imports in periods of underutilized
domestic capacity and underemployment of specialized labor. The
existence of these constraints does not, however, justify protection
for expansion of capacity, or expansion of employment of skilled
labor, which has a high opportunity cost elsewhere in the economy.
Finally, CGE may have been less aggressive in acquiring export
orders because it calculated that the opportunity cost of filling export
orders, without increased protection of domestic sales opportunities,
wouldbe higher than the prices it could obtain in competition with
the most aggressive foreign producers. If that is the case, it seems
likely that the domestic producer's cost also would exceed the excep-
tionally low prices that provincial utilities paid for the disputed
imports. Replacement of these disputed imports thus would not be
in the national interest, unless there was a discrepancy between the
private and the social opportunity cost of domestic production, and
the social opportunity cost of domestic production was less than the
cost of imports.244
E. THE MYTH OF PREDATORY PRICING
Antidumping policy is often regarded as a defense against so-
called "predatory pricing" by foreign producers. The argument that
it is in the national interest to protect domestic producers against
and B. Epstein ed. 1972); Mit Geheimkodes den Marki im Griff, 33 DER SPIEGEL 66
(1979).
243. CGE Submission, Import Policy, supra note 183, at 23.
244. Discrepancies between private and social costs were assumed away at the begin-
ning of this section. This assumption can be justified in view of the strong demand for
highly skilled labor during the period under investigation, and in view of the extremely
long lead times that are used in this industry. These factors usually make it possible for
employers to avoid abrupt and massive layoffs. For a discussion of how the rationale of
antidumping policy is affected in situations where the private cost of labor exceeds its
social opportunity cost, see K. STEGEMANN, EFFICIENCY RATIONALE, supra note 87, at
35-44.
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predatorily priced imports is tenuous in the abstract, and invalid in
the turbines and generators cases. 245 Clarifying what is meant by
predatory pricing will demonstrate the weaknesses of this argument.
A businessman regards the pricing practices of competitors as
"predatory" if they encroach on his traditional market and "rob"
him of customers that he considers his own. Businessmen try to
avoid cutting prices on sales they would make anyway. Therefore,
penetration of new markets, or of markets that are less secure, fre-
quently is achieved by price differentiation in favor of new or less
secure customers. Dumping is the colorful, though legally dignified,
term that is applied to describe price differentiation in international
markets. If dumping by foreigners causes injury to domestic produ-
cers, the latter are generally correct in complaining about "predatory
pricing," provided the domestic producers simply mean that aggres-
sive foreign pricing causes them to lose customers, or forces them to
cut their own prices in defense. Yet, the fact that foreign competi-
tion is aggressive and involves selective price cutting is not a suffi-
cient reason to conclude that protection against dumping is in the
national interest. On the contrary, in many oligopoly situations very
little price competition would occur if price differentiation were
eliminated.246
Narrower definitions of predatory pricing are needed to support
an argument for government intervention. The narrower definitions
generally focus on the use of price differentiation to defend or
enlarge the market power of dominant producers. Under these defi-
nitions, selective price cutting is employed by the dominant produ-
cers to discipline unruly competitors, or to eliminate rival producers.
In either case, the predator hopes to recover the cost of temporary
price cutting by making higher monopoly profits in the future. Thus,
buyers may lose more in the long run than they gain, while prices are
unusually low in the short run.
The use of short-term price cutting as a disciplinary tool does
not apply to antidumping cases. Testimony to a legislative commit-
tee on behalf of CGE, however, suggested that the elimination of
Canadian production had been a primary motivation for foreign
competitors involved in the company's eight antidumping cases
between 1969 and 1980:
most of these cases that we have had are extraordinarily predatory; the objec-
tive apparently is 'price is not the object, but let us get rid of the Canadian
competitor' and they are in there 25 and 30 per cent below the price range
245. See generally id at 29-35 and 54-57.
246. See generally F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE ch. 5-7, 10 (2d ed. 1980); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1947).
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and that is a red light, I think.2 47
It is evident that CGE used the allegation of predatory pricing,
in the narrower sense, to impress the committee with the urgency of
the need to increase protection against dumping. Yet, strangely
enough, there is no reference to this particular reason for dumping in
either the antidumping legislation or the Tribunars Rules of Proce-
dure. Furthermore, predatory intent apparently was not an issue in
any of the Tribunal's cases.248 In the turbines and generators cases,
CGE's reasons for omitting claims about predatory pricing become
obvious in light of the evidence presented in those cases.2 49 The
existence of potentially intervening bids rendered implausible any
argument that foreign dumping was intended to destroy the Cana-
dian producer. The Soviet Union's extremely low bids clearly were
aimed at winning turbine contracts against traditional Japanese sup-
pliers in British Columbia.250 Similarly, the Japanese producers of
generators must have been concerned more about other foreign com-
petitors than about CGE, as B.C. Hydro was known to be dis-
enchanted with the domestic producer.251 Thus the argument that
the most aggressive foreign bidders expected to attain a monopoly
position in the Canadian market by eliminating the domestic pro-
ducer is inconsistent with the evidence in both the turbines and the
generators cases.
The predatory intent argument is no more plausible when
applied to the alleged threat of injury from future dumping. CGE's
argument in the turbines and generators cases was built on the pre-
diction that dumping would persist for the foreseeable future, and
that foreign prices could be expected to remain substantially below
CGE's desired prices because of worldwide excess capacity. It
would have been obviously inconsistent with this prediction to argue
that the elimination of the domestic producer would leave Canadian
buyers susceptible to exploitation by a particular foreign producer,
or group of producers.
Furthermore, proposing that antidumping action will protect
domestic buyers against future exploitation by foreign producers
clearly implies that domestic buyers are shortsighted enough to
become dependent on foreign monopolies. This implies another
type of market failure. What grounds are there to believe that inter-
247. Minutes, supra note 166, at 8:16 (testimony of Mr. A.J. Cartwright, Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian General Electric Limited).
248. For a discussion of the tenuous relationship between the antidumping law of the
United States and predatory pricing, see generally Caine, A Casefor Repealing the Anti-
dumping Pro visions ofdhe TariffAct of 1930, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681,708-11 (1981).
249. See supra §§ II and III.
250. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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vention by the federal government is required to protect provincial
utilities such as B.C. Hydro from their own shortsightedness? If
domestic buyers were not knowledgeable of international markets,
why would domestic producers be unable to convince potential cus-
tomers of the long-run advantages of buying domestic products?
The possible existence of a "free rider" problem suggests one answer
to these questions. That is, B.C. Hydro might hope to benefit from
the existence of a relatively safe domestic supply of equipment, with-
out having an obligation to support the domestic producer when
cheaper alternative supplies are available. There are several reasons,
however, why the free rider problem is not applicable to B.C.
Hydro's purchases of hydroelectric equipment. First, according to
CGE's evidence, it is possible that domestic production of certain
lines of equipment might not have survived foreign competition
without antidumping protection. Second, any domestic production
capacity for turbines and generators remaining in the absence of
antidumping protection would have been made available first to
"loyal" customers. Finally, in times of tight supply, B.C. Hydro
could not have expected to obtain better terms from CGE than from
suppliers on the world market. Thus, there is no free rider problem
in the case of hydroelectric equipment.
B.C. Hydro evidently is convinced that the long-run interest of
the company and its customers would be served best by unrestricted
international tendering. In light of ten years of antidumping action,
and recent proposals to strengthen the deterrence effect of the Act,
most provincial utilities understandably express greater concern
about the very real threat of becoming dependent on a domestic
monopoly, than about the relatively remote risk of becoming depen-
dent on foreign monopolies.
Another conceivable cause of market failure is the shortsighted-
ness of domestic investors. Government intervention might be
required if decision-makers within CGE, or potential sources of
investment funds, such as the banks, overreacted to a temporary
slump in sales or prices, and refused to approve investments that
would be in the long-run interest of the company and the country.
The "corn hog cycle" in agricultural production is an example of
using the shortsightedness of private decision-makers to justify gov-
ernment intervention.252 An industrial giant like CGE, however,
probably does not suffer from this type of shortsightedness.
During the generators hearing, CGE argued that its Board of
Directors was unwilling to approve investments which would have
been critical in expanding the company's hydroelectric equipment
252. See W.J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, ch. 7 (3d ed. 1970).
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capacity for key facilities, as long as the domestic market was
threatened by dumped imports.253 The attitude of CGE's Board
most likely reflected a realistic assessment that without additional
protection against dumping, even the relatively modest investment
required to alleviate bottlenecks would have been unwise. The
money would have gone to waste because free market prices under
circumstances of world-wide excess capacity would not have covered
CGE's incremental cost of production, including the cost of new
facilities. Protection against future dumping might make additional
investment profitable for the company, but still might represent a
waste of resources to the nation as a whole.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Waste of the country's resources is not the Tribunars concern
under its current mandate. A finding of "material injury" only
requires a determination of whether or not the complainant would
be better off in the absence of dumping. Past experience shows that
a finding of future injury may remain in force for ten years or
longer.25 4 Special protection over such a long period certainly will
encourage new investment, and the hiring and training of highly
skilled labor. The Tribunal's hearings and decisions concerning
heavy electrical equipment emphasize that the intent behind
antidumping action in those cases was to assure the long-run viabil-
ity of expanding domestic production, rather than to assist in a tem-
porary emergency situation.
Import substitution almost certainly would have resulted in a
net national burden if antidumping action had enabled CGE to win
the turbine contracts that the company claims to have lost because of
dumping during the early 1970's.255 There are no reasons to believe
that import substitution will be less wasteful during the period for
which the Tribunal's finding of future injury will be in effect. Simi-
larly, it has been demonstrated that the buyers of turbines and gener-
ators would have suffered from higher prices on continuing imports,
if antidumping measures for these products had been in effect during
the 1970's.256 To the extent that importation continues in the future,
the Tribunars decisions will cause a national burden which must be
added to any burden of import substitution, because buyers of
253. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
254. 1 ADT ANN. REP., supra note 28, at 12-51. Note particularly the transformers
decision, issued in November, 1970, and confirmed in April, 1977. Id at 42.
255. See supra § IV.
256. See supra notes 93-162 and accompanying text.
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imports will pay higher prices than they would have in the absence
of antidumping action.
Measuring the burden of the existing antidumping decisions is
not possible, because data on the alternative cost of importation that
would have applied in the absence of antidumping action is not
available. Indeed, if Canada implements certain recent proposals to
"strengthen" Canadian antidumping policy, it may never again be
possible to observe the most advantageous import prices that Cana-
dian buyers could enjoy in the absence of antidumping policy. The
new proposals focus on deterring dumping. CGE, in particular, has
recommended a "three-pronged" deterrence approach to prevent
foreign producers from obtaining "free bites" in the Canadian mar-
ket.257 If deterrence becomes effective without a specific decision by
the Tribunal, it would no longer be possible to observe the best
opportunities that importers are missing. Consequently, it would no
longer be possible to evaluate the burden of antidumping policy.
Although this article has for the most part discussed two indi-
vidual cases, a number of general conclusions on antidumping policy
follow from the analysis of the net national burden in those cases. 258
First, antidumping measures can cause a considerable net bur-
den to the importing country. This result is not generally under-
stood. Indeed, it appears that in the view of the public, including the
media, politicians, senior government officials, most lawyers special-
ized in trade matters, and many professional economists, the preven-
tion of "material injury" to domestic production is coincident with
prevention of injury to the country. Public awareness of the true
nature of the benefits and burdens of the antidumping process would
facilitate clarification of the objectives of antidumping policy.
Assuming that antidumping policy ought to serve the national inter-
est, it is essential that the Tribunal be given a mandate to investigate
questions concerning the national burden, rather than merely the
interests of import-competing producers.
The Tribunal could handle a broader mandate within the estab-
lished limits on its time and resources. The Tribunal's decisions
under this broader mandate could derive from the same type of evi-
dence that is reviewed under the present mandate. In addition, the
Tribunal might consider presentations from interested government
agencies, such as the Bureau of Competition Policy. Formalization
of the decision-making process under a new mandate might result in
257. See generally Minutes, supra note 166, at 8:8; Stegemann, Special Import Meas-
ures, supra note 11.
258. See also Minutes, supra note 166, at 26:4 (1982) (submission of Klaus
Stegemann).
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greater efficiency and predictability. 259
In addition, still assuming that antidumping policy ought to
serve the national interest, the merits of antidumping action must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis before the protection becomes
effective. In particular, the government should be most reluctant to
make changes in the law that would strengthen the deterrent effects
of antidumping measures. Whenever enforcement of antidumping
law depends on deterrence, ascertaining whether the implementation
of protection is in the national interest becomes impossible. A policy
that depends on case-by-case implementation also requires that the
parties opposing protective measures be given the time and opportu-
nity to present relevant evidence.
Third, if the government is unwilling to broaden the Tribunal's
mandate, preserving the case-by-case approach remains important,
because only case-by-case investigation of the cause of injury can
prevent the burden of higher import prices. If CGE's "three-
pronged" deterrence approach had been in effect during the 1970's,
the domestic producer might not have won any additional contracts,
but domestic buyers of imports would have paid substantially higher
prices.
Even assuming that the government is unwilling to broaden the
Tribunal's mandate, increased public awareness of the potential bur-
den of antidumping measures should help to restrain enforcement
activities and other activities, such as advance monitoring, that tend
to harass importers. Furthermore, it would be wise to make use of
the currently available option of assessing antidumping duties at less
than the margin of dumping. 260
At the minimum, the government should use its powers under
the override provision of the Antidumping Act more regularly,261
and should waive or set aside antidumping measures when they
would severely damage the national interest. 262 An override should
account for the objectives of other government policies, such as com-
petition policy, and for adverse repercussions for Canada's exports,
which might result from antidumping action against certain
259. For instance, the decision process could be formalized by analogy to the system
proposed by Oliver E. Williamson. See Williamson, Saccharin: An Economist's View, in
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 131-51 (R.W. Crandell
and L.B. Lave eds. 1981).
260. This option is provided for in Article VI of the GATT, 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, and Article
8 of the Anti-dumping Code, Code, supra note 12, at Art. 8.
261. Section 7 of the current Act, Anti-dumping Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. A-15, § 7
(1970), and § 11 of the proposed legislation contain the override provision.
262. To the author's knowledge, the current Act has been waived only for pharmaceu-
tical products. Anti-dumping Regulations § 23, 106 CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS. 876 (1972).
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imports. 263 The override should also account for the availability of
domestic measures that might provide temporary assistance for
injured industries or their workers, and would not force foreign sup-
pliers to raise the prices of Canadian imports.
Finally, protective measures must not be maintained in
perpetuity. While the Tribunal has pledged repeatedly that it will
examine its findings to consider a formal review in regular intervals
of about three years,264 there are always pressures from the affected
industries and government agencies to continue the protection long
enough to make new investment profitable.265 For this reason,
strengthening the review provision of the Act seems advisable. Such
an amendment should include a "sunset" clause, under which all
special import measures would lapse five years after the original
decision, unless it can be established that their continuation is in the
national interest.
263. In this context, it should be noted that Article 8(1) of the Tokyo Round Anti-
dumping Code includes an exhortation to the participating parties to reserve to them-
selves discretion in deciding whether to impose antidumping duties in individual cases.
See Code, supra note 12, at Art. 8(1). In fact, the European Economic Community
(EEC) antidumping law requires that, before any duty is imposed, it must be shown not
only that injurious dumping exists, but also that "the interests of the Community call for
intervention." Council Regulation No. 3017/79, Arts. 11(l), 12(1), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L. 339) 1 (1979).
264. A recent submission stated that the "Tribunal has instituted the practice of
examining findings of material injury which have been in place for a minimum of three
years." Presentation of the Anti-dumping Tribunal to the Sub-Committee on Import
Policy of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, reprinted in
Minutes, supra note 166, at 22A:5 (emphasis added).
265. "In timing of its reviews of injury findings, the Tribunal should recognize the
long-cycle nature of capital goods transactions. Reviews of such findings should take
place much less frequently than in the case of other goods." EEMAC SUBMISSION, supra
note 32, at 5.
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Appendix A
Canadian Anti-dumping Procedures
Complaint received DM may initiate investigation
from Canadian producer. on his own.
Initial Enquiries.
)M is of the opinion DM is of the opinion DM is of the opinion
that there is no that there is no evidence that there is evidence
evidence of injury. of dumping. of dumping and injury.
DM terminates
proceedings. [
DM or complainant Tribunal is of the opinion that
may refer question of- there is no evidence of injury.
injury to Tribunal. Tribunal is of the opinion that.DM initiates an investigation.
there is evidence of injury.
Investigation.
DM is satisfied that DM concludes that DM is satisfied that there is
goods are being dumped there is no evidence insufficient evidence of
and the margin of dumping of injury. dumping or that the dumping
is not negligible. is negligible.
DM[ may DM or complainant I
terminate proceedings. may refer question DM terminates
of injury proceedings.
to Tribunal.
DM akes a toTribunal is of ri
Preliminary Determinatin Tib Tribunal is ofof Dumping. a Lthe opinion that there is the opinion that there is
o evidence of injury, no evidence of injury.
DM makes reference Goods are entered
to Tribunal. provisionally.
Tribunal makes
a finding.
(Provisional period ends).
Injury finding. No injury finding.
DM makes a Final
D~etermination of Proceedings are terminated.
Dumping.
Anti-dumping duties are Any provisional duty collected
assessed on the basis of is refunded,
the Final Determination.
REVENUE CANADA, CUSTOMS AND Excisc. Canada's Anti-dumpmg Legislation.(broetmure) (P976).
Any overpayment of provisional
duty is refunded. Note: DM signifie Deputy Minister ofNational Revenue. Customs & Excise Tribunal
signifies the Anti-dumpiag Tribunal.
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